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EX PARTE INTERVIEWS WITH ENTERPRISE
EMPLOYEES: A POST-UPJOHN ANALYSIS
Louis A. STAm*
Law is a deep science; its boundaries, like space, seem to recede

as we advance: and though there may be as much of certainty in
it as in any other science, it is fit we should be modest in our
opinions, and ever willing to be further instructed. Its acquisition
is more than the labor of a life, and after all can be with none the
subject of an unshaken confidence ....

Hoffman's Fifty Resolu-

tions in Regard to Professional Deportment, No. XXXIV (1836).'

I.

PARTIES AND WrrIssEs: TE HISTORICAL FAILURE TO PROPERLY
CEARAcTERIzE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES

When a party represented by counsel is an individual, adverse counsel
will normally have no difficulty applying the ethical prohibition against
communicating with such a party without the consent of that party's
attorney. However, difficult ethical issues can and do arise when one of
the parties is a corporation or other enterprise which acts through employees

or agents.
The traditional rules of professional conduct have been that an attorney
may contact any former employee of an enterprise and those current

* Partner, Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon, Phoenix, Arizona. B.A., Wheeling Jesuit
College, 1962; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1971. Much of the research for and writing
of this article was done during the fall of 1986 while I was the Frances Lewis Lawyer in
Residence at Washington and Lee Law School. I am grateful to the Law Center for its support
and encouragement; however, the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Law Center.
Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. DAVID HoFFmAN, A CouRSE OF LiEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1836), reproduced in DRMxNE,
LEAL ETmcs at 338 (1953).
2. The term "enterprise" is used as an all-inclusive term that encompasses any organization
or entity that acts through employees or agents, including corporations, partnerships, joint
ventures and other forms of association, as well as sole proprietorships. The concepts and
principles discussed in this article generally will have application to any kind of employment or
agency relationship, without regard to the formal label that might be attached to the relationship.
See, e.g., Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal.3d 603, 510 P.2d 719, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973) (business
partners); Massachusetts Bar Association Opinion 82-7 ("If the employee of a corporation may
be a 'party' for purposes of DR 7-107(A)(1), there seems to be no special reason why an
employee of a sole proprietorship who has power to commit the sole proprietorship ought not
to be able to be considered a 'party' as well.") See also MoDEL RuLEs OF PROSSIoNAL CoNDucT,
Rule 1.13 comment (1983).
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employees who cannot "speak for" or "commit" the employer. These
rules are of doubtful validity after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Upjohn Co. v. United States,4 the adoption of the Model Rules of Evidence
by the federal courts5 and a number of state courts, and the adoption by
the American Bar Association and a growing number of states of the new

Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 6 Moreover, there are sound policy
reasons why the ethical restrictions on a lawyer's ability to conduct ex parte

interviews with past and present enterprise employees ought to be coextensive with the parameters of the attorney-client privilege as defined by
Upjohn and the burdens imposed upon an enterprise by the law of agency
and the rules of evidence. In other words, to the extent that a past or
present employee of an enterprise may have conversations with the enterprise's attorney which are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and/or
the acts of past or present employees may give rise to liability on the part

of the enterprise and/or their statements while employed may constitute an
admission by the enterprise, such employees should not be subject to ex
parte interviews by opposing counsel but should be subject to discovery
only through the processes which must be utilized in the case of a party

opponent.
A.

TiE ATTORNEY/CLrENT PRIVILEGE: AN

EVOLVING CONCEPT

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege known to the common
law. 7 The attorney-client privilege has been expanded and contracted over
the centuries as the battle raged between those who argue that the privilege
interferes with the search for truth and those who believe that the privilege
is a necessary prerequisite to complete freedom of consultation between a
lawyer and a client, with the ultimate objectives being the proper represen-

3. The ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct summarizes the traditional
rule.
When the adverse party is a corporation, questions arise concerning which officers and
employees can be interviewed without the consent of the corporation's counsel. Various
rules of thumb have been formulated to guide attorneys. These guides are based on
the distinction between officers and directors with power to bind the corporation and
employees lacking such power to bind. The former tend to be considered parties while
the latter are considered witnesses, who may be interviewed without the permission of
the corporation or its counsel.
ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 71:313-71:314 (1984).
4. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
5. The Model Rules of Evidence were adopted by the federal courts in 1975. See Rules
of Evidence Act, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1929 (1975); Federal Criminal Code and
Rules, p. 205 et seq. (West 1987 ed.). See also 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 7051
(tracing legislative history of Federal Rules of Evidence).
6. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1983. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 01:101. As of August,
1986, seventeen states had adopted the new rules or a variant. Id. at 01:3.
7. 8 J. WbOMoRE, WboMoRE ON EvIDENcE § 2290 at 542 (McNaughton revised ed. 1961).
See also Sexton, A Post Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 443, 445 (1982).
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tation of the client and the protection of the client's legal rights. 8
Although practitioners and scholars have long argued, and no doubt
will continue to argue over the policy considerations which underlie the
existence and scope of the attorney-client privilege, especially as applied to
corporations, after Upjohn those arguments are in a sense academic. 9 In
Upjohn, the United States Supreme Court has chosen the policies which it
believes should be given priority and which it wishes to advance.10 If we
assume that the Court will be reasonably consistent during the foreseeable
future, any currently viable analysis of the scope of the attorney-client
privilege as applied to an enterprise must proceed from the assumptions
incorporated in the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn. For the same
reason, any discussion of corollary or related doctrines, such as the definition
of a party for discovery purposes, must proceed from the same assumptions;
in other words, if one accepts the premise that mid- and even low- level
enterprise employees may have conversations with counsel for the enterprise
that are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and such employees are
treated as "parties" or "party representatives" for that purpose, logical
consistency would seem to require that all such enterprise employees also
be treated as parties or party representatives for discovery purposes. Likewise, to the extent that employees may bind the enterprise by their acts or
statements, on the theory that such acts or statements are those of a
"party," consistency and fairness require that discovery of such party
conduct and admissions be conducted not ex parte but with the safeguards
which attach to discovery directed at any party opponent.

B.

THE TRADITIONAL RULE GOVERNING DIscoERY FROM ENTERPRISE
EMPLOYEES

For years the standard treatise on lawyers' professional conduct was
Drinker's Legal Ethics, published in 1953. Drinker noted that many of the
legal profession's ethical principles are based on what had once been the
leading text on the subject, Judge Sharswood's ProfessionalEthics, which
was first published in 1854 "when law was practiced in a very different
world from that in which we now live."" The world in which we now live
and in which law is practiced is, of course, quite different from the world
in which Professor Drinker wrote. While many of the ethical rules governing
the practice of law seemed to have changed little over the years, in some
cases that may be due more to a failure to periodically reexamine such rules
in light of changing conditions than to the continuing validity of the rules

8. See Sexton, supra note 7, at 445, et seq. (discussing historical development of
attorney-client privilege).
9. See Saltzburg, Corporateand Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested
Approach, 12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 279 (1984) (discussing rationale for attorney-client privilege
and reasons corporations are entitled to same protections as natural persons).
10. See infra text accompanying note 40 et seq.
11. DRnciK, supra note 1, at ix.
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themselves. The principles governing communications with parties and witnesses illustrate the way in which lawyers sometimes elevate vague concepts
to the level of a "rule" and then apply the rule over the years without any
real analysis of its propriety and with little consideration of its utility in
resolving practical problems.

The ethical obligations imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs lawyers' conduct in a majority of jurisdictions 2 ,
have created at best confusion and uncertainty, and at worst conflicting
obligations, when counsel for a party to pending or prospective litigation
wishes to interview the employees of an adverse party. 3 On the one hand,

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates a lawyer to
represent his client zealously. On the other, DR 7-104(A)(1) provides that

a lawyer shall not "communicate on the subject of the representation with
a party he knows to be represented" by counsel without the "prior consent
of the lawyer representing such other party." Unfortunately, the Code does
not define the term "party." As a consequence, these vague injunctions
may effectively put a lawyer in an ethical dilemma when faced with an
opportunity to conduct an ex parte interview of another party's employee;
is the employee to be treated as a "party" or "party representative" who
cannot be interviewed ex parte, or is the employee a mere witness who can
be interviewed by an adverse party without notice to or the permission of

counsel for the enterprise? Canon 9 only adds to the ambiguity of the
situation by providing that a lawyer "should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety." While everyone would agree that lawyers should

avoid the appearance of impropriety, such vagaries are rarely of much
assistance when one is required to choose a specific course of conduct from
4
conflicting alternatives, each of which may involve impropriety.

It makes little sense to lay down rules that are at best ambiguous and
at worst conflicting, and then impose sanctions on a lawyer whose reasonable

12. ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, p. 1:301.
13. A number of commentators have criticized the vagueness and ambiguity of various
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal
Rules and ProfessionalAspirations, 30 C.EVE. ST. L. REv. 571 (1981); Panel Discussion, 35 U.
Mmisi L. Rev. 669 (1981). One author has called the "conflicting duties" created by the Code
of Professional Responsibility "a fundamental flaw." Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 24 WAsHmuRN L. J. 443, 450 (1985).
14. The uncertainty associated with application of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine also may present an ethical dilemma for counsel. As the Supreme Court noted
in Upjohn, "the first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual
background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the legally relevant." Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 390-391 (citing ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1). However,
in gathering background information an attorney must carefully weigh the possibility that his or
her investigation will in effect create evidence that will become available to the opposition. In
other words, the diligent attorney's effort to comply with the requirements of EC 4-1 may injure
the client if it is later determined that the fruits of counsel's efforts are not protected. See
Weinschel, CorporateEmployee Interviews & the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B. C. INDUS. &
COM. L. Rav. 873 (1970) (discussing some of the problems facing enterprise counsel who wishes
to interview its employees).
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and good faith analysis of a fact specific problem happens to be different
than that of a court or disciplinary authority. That is especially true when

one considers that a lawyer is often forced to make difficult judgments
with little time for research or extended analysis, while courts and disciplinary authorities are usually afforded the luxury of a retrospective analysis
and whatever research and period of contemplation they require.
Defining parties and witnesses for discovery purposes is an undertaking

that deserves and requires more careful analysis than it has received from
most courts and bar associations. A fair resolution may be critical to the
party litigants and, of equal importance, understandable and practical

guidelines are vital to the lawyers who must attempt to implement them.
The penalty paid by both attorney and client for an improper contact with

a witness later determined to be a party can be severe-disqualification of
counsel. As one court noted, "[A]n order granting disqualification seriously
disrupts the progress of the litigation and decisively sullies the reputation
of the affected attorney.""
The courts and ethics committees of a number of bar associations for
years sought to resolve this ethical dilemma by the formulation of a rule

which turned on an often subjective effort to determine which employees
16
were sufficiently identified with an enterprise so as to be its "alter ego."

The specific tests which were adopted to measure the sufficiency of the
employee's identification with the enterprise took several forms. Some

authorities articulated the test in terms of whether the individual was a
"management level employee.

' 17

Other authorities asked whether the em-

15. Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 546
F.2d 1022, 1025, n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
16. See Frey v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
In Frey, an employment discrimination action, the court concluded that the term "party" in DR
7-104 encompassed those employees who were the defendant's alter ego, and that at least those
high level managerial employees who participated in the decision not to promote the plaintiff
fell within that category. See also Virginia Bar Assoc. Opinion No. 530 (1983) (during pending
litigation, lawyer may communicate with employee of adverse party provided that employee does
not occupy position with authority to commit organization to specific courses of action that
would lead one to believe employee is corporation's alter ego).
17. See New York City Bar Association Opinion 613 (1942), in which it was held that,
under Canon 39 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, "only managing employees represent the
corporation for the purpose of examination of the corporation before trial." See also In re
F.M.C. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). In In re F.M.C. the court held
that the prohibition against ex parte communications with corporate employees is limited to
managing employees, in that case the president, board chairman and resident plant managers.
The implied rationale of such opinions is that only the highest level employees of a corporation
have the authority to bind a corporation by what they say. This assumption is unrealistic. See
infra notes 131 et seq. and accompanying text.
Generally, bar associations have interpreted DR 7-104 so as to include management level
and executive personnel within the definition of a "party" when dealing with enterprises. Note,
DR 7-104 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility Applied to the Government "Party," 61
Mim. L. Rv. 1007, 1016 n.36, 1017 n.39, and 1018 n.42 (1977) (discussion of several
representative state court ethics opinions dealing with this issue).
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ployee "could commit the corporation because of their authority."' 8 Yet

others sought to determine whether the employee "could commit the corporation in the particular situation." 19 These tests did little, if anything, to

18. See ABA Informal Opinion 1410 (1978). In ABA Informal Opinion 1410, the American
Bar Association attempted to identify those employees of a corporation who would be treated
as parties and, therefore, would not be subject to ex parte interviews.
If the officers and employees that you propose to interview could commit the
corporation because of their authority as corporate officers or employees or for some
other reason the law cloaks them with authority, then they, as the alter egos of the
corporation, are parties for the purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1). The right of a corporation
to representation by counsel must prevail over opposing counsel's unrestricted access
to officers and employees of the corporation. Where an officer or employee can
commit the corporation, opposing counsel must view the officer or employee as an
integral component of the corporation itself and therefore within the concept of a
"party" for the purposes of the Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ABA Informal Opinion 1410 is vague and does not define such phrases as "could commit
the corporation because of their authority" or "for some other reason the law cloaks them with
authority." In other words, the opinion can be read as narrowly or as broadly as one might be
inclined; nevertheless, the opinion is of interest because it not only recognizes that adequate
representation by counsel requires that certain employees be treated as "parties," it also recognizes
that the corporation's right to counsel must prevail over an opposing party's right to conduct ex
parte interviews with certain corporate employees. Likewise, the opinion is important because it
expressly recognizes that, to the extent an employee may be deemed to speak for the corporation
in some relevant sense, the employee must be deemed the alter ego of the corporation and,
therefore, a party or party representative for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1).
Although ABA Informal Opinion 1410 appears to be consistent with the pre-Upjohn
consensus on the issue, a minority of bar associations took a broader view. For example, in
Texas Bar Association Opinion No. 342 (1968), it was held that:
lAin attorney is precluded from communicating with either officers or directors of a
corporation or any employees whose acts or omissions are the subject of controversy
and for which the corporation may be liable.
See Note, DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applied to the Government
"Party," supra note 17.
19. In often cited ABA Informal Opinion No. 1377 (1977), dealing with the right of counsel
to interview a governmental entity's building marshal, the American Bar Association applied a
variant of the alter ego theory. Typically, the ABA's opinion turned on the resolution of a
factual question: Could the building marshal "commit the municipal corporation in the particular
situation because of his authority as a corporate officer or as some other legally invested
authority"; if so, he was the "alter ego of the corporation," and therefore "a party for purposes
of DR 7-104(A)(1)." The ABA also concluded that "the right of the municipal corporation to
representation by counsel must prevail over opposing counsel's unrestricted access to officers and
employees of the municipal corporation."
The opinion is illustrative of how bar association opinions on this issue raised more questions
than they answered. An attorney would have to somehow resolve a mixed question of fact and
law to determine whether the marshal "could commit the municipal corporation in the particular
situation." Interestingly enough, none of the opinions appear to speak to the most obvious
question any attorney would have: by what standard is this determination to be made. The ethics
opinions do not focus on whether the fact that the employee's conduct might be imputed to the
corporation and/or the fact his or her statements might be deemed party admissions are the kind
of "commitments" or "other legally invested authority" referred to.
Like so many other opinions on the subject, ABA Informal Opinion 1377 also ignored the
fact that whether a particular employee could in some fashion "commit" the enterprise is often
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eliminate the inherent ambiguity in the Code or to provide practical guidance
to the lawyer who had to make a choice between his duty to pursue every
legitimate source of available information and his duty not to communicate
20
with anyone who could be considered to be an adverse party.

a difficult question of law that is anything but free from doubt. Left with questions of fact and
law which had to be resolved before the opinion would have any practical value, what was the
lawyer to do? He could hardly call the building marshal and ask whether he could commit for
his employer. A phone call to opposition counsel would have in all probability eliminated the
possibility of an ex parte interview. In short, as a practical matter, the alter ego rule and its
various formulations were of little practical assistance to members of the bar. See Michigan
Informal Opinion CI-526 (1980) (term "party" in DR 7-104(A)(1) includes "only those officers
or employees of the defendant municipal corporation who have the power to commit the
municipal corporation in a particular action"); Virginia Bar Association Opinion 459 (1984)
(holding that it is ethically improper for attorney to communicate with any employee of adverse
corporation who "could commit the corporation to certain courses of action, as its alter ego").
20. The lack of guidance provided by many bar association opinions on this subject is
illustrated by a recent opinion of the Alaska Bar Association (No. 84-11) (1984) which, after
extended discussion of the facts and applicable law, concluded:
Whether an employee of an entity may reasonably be thought of as representing that
entity in matters relating to the matter in controversy is a determination that must be
made based on the facts and circumstances of each particular situation.
The Alaska Bar Association determined that the Juneau teleconference manager for the state
Legislative Affairs Agency, a party to pending litigation, could be interviewed ex parte by adverse
counsel even though certain statements allegedly made by that individual were the subject of the
pending litigation. In its answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the state had denied that such
statements accurately reflected its policies and procedures. Although the opinion does not say,
this appears to have been a question of fact to be resolved by a jury; the legal effect of the
statements was presumably for the court. In any event, the alleged statements appeared to be
important to both parties' cases. However, when the test applied to the propriety of ex parte
interviews is whether the employee "may reasonably be thought of as representing the entity
in matters related to the matter in controversy," the propriety of the contact depends upon
the resolution of questions of fact and law which are often the subject of the underlying
litigation, questions which must be determined not by the attorneys involved but by a neutral
court and unbiased jury. See Alaska Ethics Opinions 71-1 and 84-11.
One of the potential abuses inherent in this situation is that the attorney who wishes to
conduct an ex parte interview must take the position that the employee to be interviewed does
not represent or speak for the entity in the matter which is the subject of litigation, but the
attorney may then argue to the jury that the statements elicited during an ex parte interview
constitute either an admission by the employer or, as a minimum, are the best evidence of the
employer's actual policies and practices. The problem may be compounded by the skilled
advocate's ability in such a situation to take an employee's statement out of context or otherwise
distort it.
Also illustrative is Maryland State Bar Opinion 83-4. In response to a question that itself
evidences the uncertainty that exists in this area ("may an attorney, after a litigation begins
question, outside of the discovery process, an employee of a corporate entity, in an attempt to
gather information that might be relevant, material, or important to the issues in litigation"),
the committee gave an equally vague response.
The relevant factor to be considered is whether or not the potential witness shares a
certain degree of identity with the corporate entity. Clearly officers, directors or
managing agents of a corporation share that identity. To the extent that either past
or present employees share that identity with the corporate entity, then direct communications with such individuals would be prohibited by the rules set forth in DR 7-
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Moreover, even in those cases in which one of the forms of the alter
ego test could be applied to a particular employee with relative confidence
and certainty, the alter ego test was inherently inadequate because it often
permitted adverse counsel to communicate directly with persons whose
functions within the corporation and/or whose involvement in and knowledge of the subject matter of litigation were such that their acts or statements
were effectively those of the enterprise and might well be outcome deter-

minative .2 These are the very individuals with whom it is critical that
enterprise counsel be free to communicate subject to the protection of the
attorney-client privilege if the enterprise is to be effectively represented. In

other words, even though such employees may be so-called "low-level" or
"mid-level" personnel who do not meet any of the traditional alter ego
tests, it is these employees who are really the alter egos of the enterprise in

the most important sense for purposes of asserting and protecting its rights.
It is the thought processes, conduct, words and ability of these employees
to communicate with enterprise counsel that will determine the employer's
success or failure under the rules which govern our adversary system.
That the rules governing ex parte contacts by adverse counsel with these
employees have historically been the product of inadequate analysis is
perhaps best evidenced by the fact that, as late as 1953, the issue received

only the most cursory treatment in Drinker's Legal Ethics. Although Drinker
includes a short discussion of the "duty not to negotiate with one represented
by counsel,"" the material is rudimentary at best. Drinker's discussion is
based on Canon 9 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which barred
any form of communication "on a subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel." Canon 9 in turn appears to have been based on

one of Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment.Y
Hoffman's Resolution XLIII reads as follows:

104(A)(1).
Unfortunately, the answer given seems to be typical of the kind of response lawyers have received
to requests for guidance in this particular area.
21. E.g., Missouri Informal Opinion No. 6 (1980). The question posed in Missouri Informal
Opinion No. 6 was whether, in a suit against a mass transit system as a result of an accident,
plaintiff's counsel could conduct an ex parte interview with the driver involved when the driver
was not a party defendant. The Missouri Bar concluded that such contact was not unethical "if
there has been no lawsuit filed. In fact, even if a lawsuit is filed, it is not unethical for that
driver to be interviewed unless the driver is named as a party defendant and counsel for plaintiff
has notice that the driver is represented by counsel in that litigation." The Missouri Bar committee
stated that, when a corporate party is sued, only officers and members of the board of directors
cannot be contacted by adverse counsel. Some other states have also allowed ex parte interviews
with employees whose acts were the basis of the corporation's alleged liability. See Los Angeles
Bar Association, Opinions, No. 234, reprinted in 31 L.A. BAR BULL. 267 (1956); New York City
Bar Association Opinion No. 331 (1935); North Carolina Bar Association Opinion No. 97 (1952)
(cited in 61 MIN. L. Ray. at 1018, n.42).
22. DRIN4KER, supra at 201-03.
23. DAvm HorsF.AN, A CotrsE oF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1836), reproduced in DRINCER's
LEGAL ETmcs, 338 Appendix E.
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I will never enter into any conversation with my opponent's client
relative to his claim or defense, except with the consent and in the
presence of his counsel.Y
The extent to which Hoffman and presumably other lawyers of his day
were concerned about the possibility of overreaching in the course of an
interview with an adverse party is illustrated by Resolution XLIV, which
prohibited verbal contacts with parties not represented by counsel and
mandated that when the attorney's
client's interests demand that I should still commune with [an
unrepresented party], it shall be done in writing only, and no verbal
response will be received. And if such person be unable to commune
in writing, I will either delay the matter until he employs counsel,
or take down in writing his reply in the presence of others, so that
if occasion should make it essential to avail myself of his answer,
it may be done through the testimony of others, and not by mine.
Even such cases should be regarded as the result of unavoidable
necessity, and are to be resorted to only to guard against great risk,
"
the artifices of fraud, or with the hope of obviating litigation. 2
In other words, lawyers in the early part of the nineteenth century appeared
to be acutely sensitive to the possibility of inadvertent (or conscious)
overreaching when dealing with an adverse party and were under an ethical
obligation to go to great lengths to avoid any kind of unfair advantage or
impropriety.
Even as late as 1953, Drinker seemed somewhat uncertain about the
propriety of interviews with employees of a corporation, although he concluded that "Canon 9 probably precludes interviews of managing employees
of a corporation having authority to bind it."'26 The only authority cited by
Drinker for that proposition is an opinion by the Bar of New York City.27
Nevertheless, it appears that the underlying rationales for both Hoffman's
Resolution XLIII and old Canon 9 were to prevent one party to the litigation
from obtaining an unfair advantage over the other and to assure each party
the effective representation of counsel. As Drinker noted:
The "wise and beneficient" aim of the Canon has been said to be
to "preserve the proper functioning of the legal profession as well
' 2
as to shield the adverse party from improper approaches."
Although Drinker does not even cite it in his discussion of the issue, it
is important to note that Canon 39 of the then applicable Canons of
Professional Ethics provided as follows:

24. Danzmm, supra note 22, at 201.
25. Quoted in DRswq.a, supra note 22, at 349 (emphasis supplied).

26. Id. at 201.
27. See id. (citing Opinion No. 830 by Bar of New York City).
28. Id. at 202.
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A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective
witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without
the consent of opposing counsel or party. In doing so, however, he
should scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated to induce the
witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to
affect his free and untrammeled conduct when appearing at the
trial or on the witness stand. 29
Canon 39 was not intended or construed as authority for the right to
contact a witness who was also a party. In fact, as Drinker noted, "Canon
9 precludes the interviewing of the other party despite the fact that he will
be a witness, and despite his willingness to be interviewed." 30 In other words,
the division between parties and witnesses was apparently believed to be
fairly clear-cut in the days when the Canons of Professional Ethics were
operative. 3' Drinker made only passing reference to the question of who is
a "party" for the purposes of applying the rule against communicating with
an adverse party; the single example which he gave us suggests that the
question was whether an individual was sufficiently "identified with" a
party so as to make it improper for adverse counsel to interview that
person.3 2 The question was the right one; when dealing with enterprise
employees, it was the answer given to that question which has proven to
be inadequate.
For the next thirty years, an employee's "identification with" an
enterprise would turn in large part (if not exclusively) on his formal authority
within the enterprise; authority would be measured by the employee's
position or supposed ability to "speak for" or "commit" the enterprise.
However, the employee's position was often irrelevant (a management level
employee might know nothing about the controversy and/or have little or
no actual authority with respect to the matter), and the measure of the
perceived ability of an employee to "speak for" or "commit" the enterprise
was either artificially limited to high level officers or directors, or difficult

29. Id. at 323. The original Canons of Professional Ethics were first adopted in 1908. Id.
at xi. Canon 39 was not included in the canons as originally adopted. Id. Canon 39 was added
in 1928, when it provided as follows:
Compensation demanded or received by any witness in excess of statutory allowances should be disclosed to the court and adverse counsel.
If the ascertainment of truth requires that a lawyer should seek information from
one connected with or reputed to be biased in favor of an adverse party, he is not
thereby deterred from seeking to ascertain the truth from such person in the interest
of his client.
In 1937, Canon 39 was amended to read as quoted in the text. Id. at 323, n.13.
30. Id. at.201.
31. In an early opinion, the ABA held that a witness who is also a party must be treated
as a party. See ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 187 (1938).
32. In Drinker's example, "a mother is so far identified with her minor child that it is
improper for the insurance company to be allowed to interview her where the child is represented
by counsel." DRDIKER, supra note 22, at 202.

19871

EX PARTE INTERVIEWS

1191

to apply because of the questions of fact and law that had to first be
33
resolved-questions about which lawyers could easily disagree.
II.

THE ATTORNEY-CLmNT PRVIEGE APPLMD To CoRPoRATioNs: THE
FOUNDATION FOR A NEW DEFINITION OF A "PARTY"

Although the United States Supreme Court had upheld a corporation's
assertion of the attorney-client privilege in the early years of the 20th
Century, 34 some question continued to exist with respect to the applicability

of the attorney-client privilege to corporations.3 5 As late as 1962, a federal
district court held that the attorney-client privilege, like the Fifth Amend36
ment privilege against self-incrimination, was unavailable to corporations.
However, the Seventh Circuit reversed and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 37 At about the same time, the federal court sitting in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld the availability of the privilege to
corporations; the Third Circuit denied a petition for mandamus and the
United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari."
If there was any lingering doubt about the availability of the attorneyclient privilege to corporations, it was finally resolved by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn. In that case, the Supreme Court not
only upheld the availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations,
it discussed the policy considerations underlying the application of the
privilege to such entities; the Court then broadly defined the scope of the
privilege because it concluded those policy considerations required it to do
SO.

The essential question presented in Upjohn was which of a corporation's
employees' conversations with corporate counsel may be subject to the
attorney-client privilege. The Sixth Circuit had held that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply "to the extent that the communications [with counsel]
were made by officers and agents [of the corporation] not responsible for
directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice ... for the simple

33. An ambiguous rule of ethical conduct may be worse than no rule. The scrupulous
lawyer will often refrain from acting for the benefit of his client if the proposed action involves
the possibility of improper conduct; the unscrupulous can rationalize taking whatever course
seems most advantageous. As one observer has noted, "In the real world, hortatory rules of
conduct perceived as being discretionary almost inevitably yield to the law of self-interest. . ."
Patterson, On Teaching Legal Ethics, TEE MATm'rw BE Ro LAW ScHOOL REPORTER, Fall 1982
at 1, quoted in Riger, The Model Rules and CorporatePractice-NewEthics for a Competitive
Era, 17 CoNN. L. Rnv. 729, 742, n.52 (1985).
34. United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915).

35. Sexton, supra note 7, at 447.
36. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
37. Id.
38. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus denied sub. nom., General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962),

cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). See also Sexton, supra note 7, at 447-48.
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reason that the communications were not the'client's.' ,,9 In other words,
the Sixth Circuit had adopted and applied a "control group" test to
determine which employees would be deemed to be party representatives
for purposes of the privilege.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first discussed
the policy considerations underlying the privilege.
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer being fully informed by the client. As we stated last
Term in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 63 L. Ed.2d
186, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980): "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the
client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission
is to be carried out." And in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 403, 48 L. Ed.2d 39, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976), we recognized the
purpose of the privilege to be "to encourage clients to make full
disclosure to their attorneys."' 4
The control group test which had been applied by the Sixth Circuit in
Upjohn was very similar in concept to the rule which has been applied in
an effort to determine which employees of an enterprise may be interviewed
ex parte by adverse counsel. The Supreme Court explained the reasoning
of the Court of Appeals:
"only the senior
[S]ince the client was an inanimate entity ...
management, guiding and integrating the several operations, ....
can be said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as
' 41
a whole."
The Supreme Court expressly rejected that reasoning because "such a
view, we think, overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not
only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also
the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and

39. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979).
40. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
41. Id. at 390. The Court also referred to the "similar conceptual approach" adopted by
the District Court in City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., where the court held
that if the employee communicating with counsel "of whatever rank he may be, is in a position
to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation
may take upon the advice of the attorney, ... then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply." Id.
(emphasis in original). See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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informed advice." 42 The Court's analysis turned on the scope which it
concluded must be given to the attorney-client privilege in order to permit
effective representation of the enterprise by counsel.
In the case of the individual client the provider of information
and the person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one and the
same. In the corporate context, however, it will frequently be
employees beyond the control group as defined by the court below"officers and agents ... responsible for directing [the company's]

actions in response to legal advice"-who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-level-employees can, by actions within the scope of
their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporatecounsel if he is adequately
to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential diffi43
culties.
The Court continued:
The attorney's advice will also frequently be more significant to
noncontrol group members than to those who officially sanction
the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to
convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put
into effect the client corporation's policy. See, e.g., Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Millikin, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (S.C. 1974)
("After the lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate
benefit to the Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be
given to the corporate personnel who will apply it")."
Finally, the Court concluded that:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all. The very terms of the test adopted by the court
below suggest the unpredictability of its application. The test restricts
the availability of the privilege to those officers who play a "sub-

42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility requires that
a "lawyer ...be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his
client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system." MoDEL CODE OF PROFESsMONAL REsPoNsmmrrv, EC 4-1 (1969). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose the same obligation
upon an attorney. See MODEL Ru.as OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT at Rule 1-1 (1983). The Upjohn
court inferred that the control group test runs counter to the ethical obligations imposed by EC
4-1. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91.
43. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 392.
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stantial role" in deciding and directing a corporation's legal re-

sponse. Disparate decisions in cases applying this test illustrate its
45

unpredictability.

The Upjohn decision is important for a number of reasons. First, ihe
Court expressly recognized that the protections afforded by the attorneyclient privilege are necessary to the effective representation by counsel.

Second, the Supreme Court recognized that it is the nature of the communication with counsel, and not the rank, position or status of the
employee who is a party to the communication, that is critical in determining
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.4 Upjohn expands the potential applicability of the attorney-client privilege to include all employees

47
who, by virtue of their employment, have knowledge of relevant facts.

Upjohn rejected the control group's narrow focus on the position or
decision-making authority of the employee and instead adopted a functional
test grounded in the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege, i.e.,

to facilitate a full and frank exchange of information and advice between
the attorney and client. Upjohn recognized the reality that in this day and
age many of the operative events which allegedly give rise to enterprise

liability, or which form the basis for an enterprise's defense, are uniquely
within the knowledge of lower or mid-level employees. As a practical matter,

proper representation of the enterprise is only possible when counsel for
the enterprise is able to engage in candid and uninhibited conversation with
such employees. The Upjohn rationale would be frustrated if courts were

45. Id. at 393.
46. Other courts had earlier held that the privilege may extend to communications by lower
level employees. See, e.g., In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 1 F.R.D. 377 (D.C.C. 1978). The
Ampicillin court held that the privilege extends to communications by lower level employees
relating to their employment duties when the communications are reasonably necessary to the
decision making process concerning a problem with respect to which legal advice has been sought,
provided the communications were made with the intention of keeping them confidential and
were relevant to the advice sought. ("Unless corporate personnel on a fairly low level can speak
to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is likely to be adversely
affected.") Ampicillin, 1 F.R.D. at 387. See also S.E.C. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,945 (D.C.C. 1979). The rule adopted by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
is consistent with Upjohn. See Comment to Rule 1.13 ("When one of the constituents of an
organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational
capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6") (emphasis added).
47. Some courts have held that the privilege applies to communications by any employee
when the communication relates to a request for legal advice. See, e.g., In Re LTV Securities
Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 599-603 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf and
Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 n.9 (D.C.C. 1981); In Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 47, 56-57 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. N.Y. 1960); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). See also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate
Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MicH. L. REv. 665 (1983) (well reasoned article
arguing that attorney-client privilege should protect communications of all employees with
corporate counsel).
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to allow the attorney for an opponent to interview such an employee on
an ex parte basis and possibly persuade the employee to sign a statement
or affidavit which is incomplete or which takes events out of context, and
then use the employee's statement as a party admission. Even more serious
is the possibility that such an ex parte interview would result in disclosure
of protected communications which have occurred between enterprise counsel and the employee. If, as Upjohn holds, these conversations may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege, the policy considerations which
form the underpinnings of the Supreme Court's decision suggest that such
conversations should also be protected from ex parte discovery. Third, the
Court recognized that the policy objectives underlying the privilege can be
achieved only if the enterprise's employees and its counsel in fact communicate; equally important, the Court acknowledged that if an employee and
counsel cannot communicate with confidence that their discussions will
remain confidential, the probability such communications will occur will be
reduced and the policy considerations supporting the privilege will not be
served. In other words, the Court recognized that the predictability of
confidentiality is essential to achieving the goals which the privilege seeks
to foster, including effective representation of all parties by counsel. These
goals-predictability, confidentiality and, ultimately, effective representation-would also be advanced by a prohibition on ex parte interviews with
employees who may be party representatives for purposes of applying the
privilege.
The Supreme Court responded to those who argue that rejection of the
control group test and broader application of the attorney-client privilege
in the case of a corporation would "entail severe burdens on discovery and
create a broad'zone of silence' over corporate affairs": 41
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such
as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse
position than if the communications had never taken place. The
privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not
protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communi49
cated with the attorney.
While the Upjohn court also discussed the work product doctrine, its
analysis of that rule is not directly relevant to the ethical issues presented
by ex parte contacts with employees of an adverse enterprise. 50 This is

48. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).

49. Id. See Saltzburg, supra note 9 at 282-285 (discussion of the proposition that the
attorney-client privilege does not protect information that is relevant and unprivileged but only

protects information that otherwise might not exist).
50. See Note, Attorney-Client Pivilege and Work Product Doctrine-Application in the
Corporate Context, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1577 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Attorney-Client Privilege]
(discussing work product doctrine as applied in Upjohn); see also Note, Upjohn Co. v. United
States: Death Knell for the Control Group Test and a Pleafor a Policy-Oriented Standard to
CorporateDiscovery, 31 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 1043 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Death Knell].
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because any effort to obtain an attorney's work product will almost invariably involve counsel and, if the matter cannot be resolved between the
attorneys for the parties, a judicial determination will be sought. Stated
differently, there is little, if any, danger of an ex parte effort to invade
work product. However, it is worth noting that the rationale for both the
work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege are essentially the
same. 5
The policies of the attorney-client privilege are similar to those that
underlie the work product immunity doctrine. The attorney-client
privilege also guarantees the effectiveness of the adversary system
by insuring that an attorney is fully advised of all facts surrounding
a legal controversy. The attorney is fully advised because the attorney-client privilege encourages the free flow of information from
client to attorney by insuring that the client's communications will
2
not be susceptible to disclosure.
[T]he underlying rationale of both theories-the efficacy of trial
preparation and the adversary system-is the same.53
The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, like the
rule protecting parties from ex parte communications by adverse counsel,
are procedures adopted to further a common objective-the effective representation by counsel.5 4 If, in the case of corporations, the way in which
modem enterprises function should shape the parameters of the attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine, the same realities should be
reflected in the ethical constraints placed on discovery from an enterprise.
Although the Upjohn court was not asked to and did not decide the
collateral issue under discussion here, that is, which employees of a corporate
party or enterprise are to be deemed "party representatives" for purposes
of allowing adverse counsel to conduct ex parte interviews,5 5 the policy

51. See Note, Death Knell, supra note 50, at 1051 (discussing policies underlying work
product doctrine and attorney-client privilege).
52. Id. at 1057.
53. Id. at 1061.
54. See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979). The
similarity between the rationales underlying the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision, in which the court's focus was not on

the status of the employee communicating with counsel but on the type of communication
involved. The Second Circuit stated:
The issue is not whether a particular employee comes within the ambit of the attorneyclient privilege, but whether the communication with the corporate attorney by the
employee is in furtherance of the attorney's duty to investigate the facts in order to
advise the corporate client in anticipation of litigation.
Id. at 510. See also Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
55. In Upjohn, the court did note that "here the Government was free to question the
employees who communicated with Thomas (Upjohn's vice-president, secretary and general
counsel) and outside counsel. Upjohn has provided the IRS with a list of such employees, and
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considerations upon which the Court based its decision logically apply to
this secondary issue as well. In other words, if for all of the reasons stated
in Upjohn 6 a particular employee is deemed to be a party representative
for purposes of communicating with enterprise counsel, the same policy
considerations require that the employee also be treated as a party representative for purposes of evaluating the propriety of ex parte contacts by
adverse counsel. Any other rule would permit counsel to unilaterally deal
with those who are, for all practical purposes, the adverse party.
The need for predictably secure communications with counsel also
suggests that adverse counsel ought not be permitted to engage in ex parte
contacts with enterprise employees who may have participated in privileged
communications; a rule which permits such ex parte contacts carries with it
the very real danger that privileged communications will be invaded and
can only reduce the quantity and quality of the communications which
Upjohn seeks to encourage.57
As other commentators have noted, the often inconsistent and uncertain
application of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine diminishes the utility of both and undermines the policy considerations which
support them. In the process, our adversarial system of justice is also
weakened. 8
Corporate counsel is required to anticipate whether and to what
extent a court will grant either a work product or a privilege claim.
The uncertainty in the either/or test makes pleading and discovery
needlessly protracted and expensive. Practitioners are unable to
marshal their resources effectively, and the efficacy of the adversary
system is weakened.5 9

the IRS has already interviewed some 25 of them." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396. Whether such
interviews were conducted on an ex parte basis the court does not say; inother words, whether
the government had a right to conduct ex parte interviews was neither raised by the parties nor
decided by the court. As the court stated, the government was undoubtedly free to question
employees who communicated with counsel in order to discover non-privileged, relevant information. The issue is whether such questioning should be conducted under the circumstances
applicable to parties. One of the issues which Upjohn left open was whether the premises which
the court adopted not only support application of the attorney-client privilege to the employees'
communications with counsel but also require, as a practical matter, that ex parte interviews
with the employees be prohibited.
56. See Comment, Upjohn v. United States: A Functional Expansion of the AttorneyCorporate Client Privilege, 67 IowA L. Rnv. 161 (1981) (extended analysis of Upjohn). Obviously,
Upjohn "greatly increase(s) the number of corporate employees whose communications with
counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 175.
57. See In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In In Re LTV,
the court noted that it is critical to the effective representation by counsel that the client be able
to communicate in confidence with the attorney and that the confidential nature of the communication be predictable. Id. at 602.
58. See Note, Death Knell, supra note 50, at 1085.
59. Id. at 1087.
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In other words, to the extent enterprise employees do not feel free to
6
communicate with counselw
and/or counsel is inhibited in inquiring of and
advising the employees of an enterprise, the effectiveness of representation
by counsel is inevitably reduced. When denied the effective representation
of counsel, the enterprise may be prejudiced in asserting its legitimate

interests and protecting its legal rights.
There are two ways an element of greater certainty can be introduced

into the equation. One would be by adopting and then uniformly applying
a bright line test for both the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.6 1 The probability that the courts will do so in the reasonably
foreseeable future seems remote.6 2 The other is by recognizing that the
effective representation of an enterprise by counsel requires a prohibition

60. An attorney has an ethical obligation to advise the client if their communications are
not privileged or if there may be some question with respect to the status of the communication.
See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-4 ("A lawyer owes an obligation to advise
a client of the attorney-client privilege.").
61. See Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 280. Professor Saltzburg argues that the Supreme
Court's decision in Upjohn "left lower federal courts with little to guide them in their determinations of the scope of corporate privilege." As Professor Saltzburg notes:
No matter what scope the attorney-client privilege is ultimately afforded, it is clear
that it is intended to assure clients that the information they communicate to their
attorneys in confidence will not be disclosed to others. The less certain the scope of
the privilege, the less reliance clients can place upon it. An ill-defined attorney-client
privilege thus complicates the lawyer-client relationship and frustrates the very goal
such a privilege is intended to achieve-to facilitate attorney-client communications.
There is, therefore, a need for a clear rule of corporate privilege.
Id. at 281. Other commentators have argued that the elements of a rule which can be applied
with a reasonable degree of certainty can be discerned from a careful reading of Upjohn. See
Note, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 50, at 1591.
62. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court held that privilege issues must be decided on a caseby-case basis. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396. As a result, uncertainty regarding application of the
privilege will probably continue, effectively undermining one of the essential purposes of the
privilege. See, e.g., Note, The Corporation'sAttorney-Client Gamble: PrivilegedCommunications
or Discovery Prone Disclosures, 6 NovA. L.J. 617, 625 (1982). Since enterprise employees will
be uncertain if communications with counsel can be forcibly disclosed, essential information may
not be provided to enterprise counsel. Moreover, large corporations operating on a nationwide
basis may be burdened with several different rules defining the privilege. Note, Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: The Confusion Remains After Upjohn, 17 N. ENo. L. Ray. 925, 950951 (1981-82). Not only might the rule applied vary from state to state, but whether the litigation
is filed in a state or federal court could be critical to whether a particular communication is
protected. See Note, Beyond Upjohn: Achieving Certainty By Expanding the Scope of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 FoRDHAM L. Ra,. 1182, 1189-1198 (1982) (arguing that
the attorney-client privilege should protect communications with all of the corporation's employees); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After
Upjohn?, 81 MicT. L. REv. 665, 673 n.21 (1983) (discussing lack of uniformity among state and
federal courts that apply Upjohn). If the matter happens to be pending in federal court because
of diversity jurisdiction, most federal courts would probably apply the applicable state rule
governing the attorney-client privilege. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor CorporateClients:
The Control Group Test, 84 HI-tv. L. Rry. 424, 434 n.30 (1970) (discussing many possibilities
that must be considered when seeking to determine which law of privilege will be applied to a
particular communication).
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against ex parte communications with employees who may be deemed to be
party representatives for other purposes. 63 Such a rule would not prevent
discovery of an employee's knowledge of operative events, but would help
assure, for example, that communications with counsel which are privileged
will remain privileged; the fact that an employee's discussions with counsel
are more predictably secure should enhance the probability that such communications will occur. The increased communications which should result
will not only enhance the ability of the enterprise to receive effective
representation, it will increase the probability that the entity will abide by
the requirements of the law, both of which are socially desirable goals.6
While the fact that the courts have been unable or unwilling to articulate
a "bright line" test for either the attorney-client privilege or the work
product rule gives rise to a great deal of uncertainty regarding the application
of either the rule or the privilege in specific circumstances, this "inherent
lack of predictability in the discovery arena" 65 itself provides an additional
reason for clearly distinguishing between party representatives and mere
witnesses when considering the propriety of ex parte discovery directed to
enterprise employees.
III.

Tm EMERGENCE OF A NEw RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Serious analysis and reconsideration of the alter ego rule which had
been applied to discovery from employee witnesses appears to have started
with an opinion of the New York City Bar Association shortly after Upjohn
was decided. The problem presented was a particularly difficult one for the
plaintiff because the matter in controversy was the subject of an arbitration
proceeding and, therefore, the usual discovery procedures were not available
to the parties. 66 Nevertheless, in an opinion that represents a logical extension
of the United States Supreme Court's analysis and conclusions in Upjohn,
New York City's Bar concluded in its Opinion 80-46 that "DR 7-104(A)(1)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids communication on the
subject matter of the representation with the present employees of an
adversary corporation on matters within the scope of the employees' employment, absent the consent of the corporation's counsel." 67 The Bar
Association expressly overruled its prior opinion to the contrary. 68

63. An employee may be deemed to be a party representative for any one or more of
several reasons, including application of the attorney-client privilege. See infra text accompanying
note 128 et seq.
64. If, as the Supreme Court recognized in Upjohn, "the interests and administration of
justice" require that clients be able to communicate freely with counsel, any rule which inhibits
or reduces the probability of such communication runs counter to the "broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
65. Note, Death Knell, supra note 50, at 1046 n.6.
66. New York City Bar Association Inquiry Reference No. 80-46 (1982) [hereinafter
"Opinion 80-46"].

67. Id.
68. See New York City Bar Assoc., Opinion 613 (1942).
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In the situation which gave rise to Opinion 80-46, an individual was
seeking to recover damages from a corporation for a loss allegedly caused
by the defendant. The specific issue presented was whether the plaintiff or
his attorneys could "interview present and former employees of the corporation to find out precisely how the loss occurred." There was obviously
a compelling need to conduct such interviews if it could be done ethically;
the matters about which counsel wished to inquire went to the heart of the
client's case and no other means of obtaining such information was available. The New York City Bar Association summarized the ethical problem
confronting counsel:
DR 7-104(A)(1) does not define the term "party." This omission
presents difficulties of interpretation where the party involved is a
legal entity, such as a corporation, instead of an individual. We
must assume, of course, that the rule is intended to apply to
corporate parties. But a lawyer cannot communicate with an abstract
corporate entity; rather, the lawyer must communicate, if at all,
with individual directors, officers or employees through which the
corporation acts. The question before us then is whether all or some
of these individuals should be viewed as components of the corporation itself and therefore "parties" for purposes of DR 769
104(A)(1).
The committee then noted that although the ethics committees of other
jurisdictions, as well as New York City's own, had addressed the question
in the past, for the most part all of the prior opinions were unsatisfactory
precedents.
With one exception, the opinions provide unsatisfactory precedents
since few of the opinions construe the term "party" for purposes
of DR 7-104(A)(1) in light of the interests reflected in that provision.
Moreover, the opinions are in sharp disagreement with one another. 70
While the committee agreed with the established rule that employees
with the power to "commit" a corporation "in the particular situation"
must be viewed as alter egos of the corporation, the committee concluded
that concept "addresses only part of the interest that DR-7-104(A)(1) seeks
to address: the right to effective representation."'7 The committee reasoned
that the term "party" must be construed in a manner that will assure
"effective representation for a corporate party":
We believe that the principal interest reflected in DR 7-104(A)(1)
is the party's right to effective representation of counsel. We see
69. Opinion 80-46, supra note 66.
70. Id. The New York City Bar Association noted that not only the ethics committees,
but also the courts and commentators are divided on the scope and application of DR 7-104(A)
when dealing with a corporate party.
71. Id.
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no distinction between corporate and individual parties in this
regard. To provide his client effective assistance of counsel on
matters in litigation, the corporate attorney must control to some
extent the information passing from the corporation, through its
employees, to its adversary. Indeed it is often proper for a lawyer
to advise the client that he should not talk at all. A party has a
right to refuse to volunteer information.
Even where the lawyer would not advise silence, interviews of
corporate employees of an adverse party without the knowledge and
consent of the lawyer for the corporate party may also undermine
the right to effective representation of counsel since the lawyer may
be required to supervise the manner in which information is elicited
to prevent his client from making statements which, through ambiguous use of language, may not accurately or fairly reflect the
client's position. We do not mean to suggest, of course, that an
attorney is entitled to alter or shade the facts under the guise of
zealous representation. But it is an acknowledged aspect of effective
representation that the attorney aids his client both to avoid procedural pitfalls and to present truthful statements in the most
favorable manner. As one commentator has suggested, the difference
between the knowledge and skill of a lawyer and that of the adverse
lay party justifies some limitations on the ability of an attorney to
communicate directly with lay persons. "The layman, when he
makes a statement, is-unlike the lawyer-unaware of the technical,
procedural and evidentiary framework in which he is, in fact,
operating." Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with
an Adverse Party, 51 Conn. B.J. 136, 139 (1977).72
In analyzing the requirements of effective representation by counsel,
the Bar Association of the City of New York focused not on the need for
free and candid discussion between an attorney and client, as the Supreme
Court did in Upjohn, but on another aspect of effective representation, the
need for an attorney to maintain the ability to present his client's case in
the most favorable light possible-arguably not as lofty a goal or one as
worthy of protection as that upon which the Supreme Court rested its
decision-but nevertheless, a critical component of the client's proper representation by counsel.73 Protection of a client's right to effective represen-

72. Id. Other authorities have recognized that the prohibition against direct contact between
a lawyer and an adverse party is designed to prevent lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage
by eliciting admissions against interest or the disclosure of harmful information. See Opinion
162, Arizona Bar Association (1964) (prohibition against contact between a lawyer and adverse
party to prevent lawyers from gaining unfair advantage).
73. See Mitton v. State Bar of California, 71 Cal.2d 525, 455 P.2d 753, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1969). In Mitton, the California Supreme Court recognized the importance of this aspect of
representation by counsel:
The rule was designed to permit an attorney to function adequately in his proper role
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tation is, of course, a broader concept than the attorney-client privilege,
which is but one of the means by which our system of justice helps assure
effective representation and thereby protects the rights of all parties.
The concept of effective representation is also inextricably intertwined
with the obligations and burdens which the law, including the law of agency
and evidence, imposes on parties. Thus, the New York City Bar Association
elected to ground its opinion and conclusions on the "rules of evidence and
agency law [which] attach special significance to the acts or statements of
an employee made within the scope of his employment." 74 The committee
pointed to the fact that an employee's statements might be admissible
against the corporation as an admission of a party opponent and that, in
any event, any statement by an employee of a corporation may well be
given "special weight" by a judge or jury.
The employee's out-of-court statements which would otherwise be
treated as hearsay, are admissible against the corporation as "admissions," pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, if the statements are made by the employee about matters within the scope of
his employment. Furthermore, since the finder of fact may attach
special weight to such statements by an employee of the corporation,
its counsel should be accorded knowledge of and control over access
to these statements. 75
The Bar Association expressly rejected the use of the control group test
for purposes of defining a party under DR 7-104.
We reject this alternative, however, because such a rule, in our
view, would be difficult to administer and would require the adverse
attorney to make a judgment with respect to which adversary
employees are within the "control group" that he is not competent
to make. Moreover, limiting the ban against communication to the
"control group" of a corporation fails to recognize the realities of
modern corporate operations and is at odds with the developments
in the law in the areas that we have just discussed.
Thus, it is no longer true that only managing employies or
employees within the "control group" are regarded as representatives of the corporation for purposes of speaking in its behalf.
Pursuant to the evidentiary rule, for example, it is the subject
matter of the employee's conduct or communication-i.e., whether

and to prevent the opposing attorney from impeding his performance in such role. If
a party's counsel is present when an opposing attorney communicates with a party,
counsel can easily correct any element of error in the communication or correct the
effect of the communication by calling attention to counteracting dements which may
exist. Consequently, before any direct communication is made with the opposing party,
consent of the opposing attorney is required.
78 Cal. Rptr. at 654 (emphasis added).
74. Opinion 80-46, supra note 66.
75. Id.
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the conduct or statement is within the employee's scope of employment-rather than control group concepts, that is determinative in
defining the corporate party. Accordingly, with respect to a particular transaction that is litigated, the power to "commit" the corporation could be vested in the most ministerial employee.7 6
The New York City Bar Association concluded that the interests of an
enterprise as a client can be adequately protected only by applying the
prohibition of DR 7-104 to all of the current employees who opposition
counsel seeks to question with respect to "acts within the scope of their
employment."
On balance, then, the Committee believes that the interests
protected by applying DR 7-104 to all present corporate employees
sought to be questioned concerning acts within the scope of their
employment outweigh the interests that would be advanced if DR
7-104 were limited to corporate officers and directors. As Professor
Leubsdorf points out:
"If it is desirable to protect the corporation from being
outwitted by opposing counsel, this can only be done by
protecting the employees through whom it speaks. If the rule
were limited to managing agents with power to bind the
corporation to a settlement, it would not achieve its declared
purpose of protecting clients against dangers sweeping far
beyond improvident settlement."
"The high executives who are protected by the rule against
opposing counsel are the employees most able to protect
themselves and their employer, if necessary by calling in counsel. The employees least likely to be wary and with the least
77
access to good advice are left exposed to prowling attorneys."
However, the Bar Association of the City of New York was unwilling
to expand the ban on ex parte interviews to all of an enterprise's employees
or to its former employees. 78 The Bar first concluded that ex parte interviews

76. Id. Cf. Fair Automotive Repairs, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., 128 Ill. App.3d 763, 471
N.E.2d 554, 561 (Ill. App. 1984) (applying the "control group" test to Rule 7-104).
77. Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and
the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. Rarv. 683 at 695-96. Although these comments are cited
by the New York City Bar Association as support for its conclusions, Leubsdorf's view is that
"opposing counsel should be free to contact directly any employee, high or low, who is a
possible witness without notice to the employer's counsel." Id. at 708.
78. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402-403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Although the majority in Upjohn declined to decide whether former employees may fall within
the scope of the attorney-client privilege, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion,
stated that "[t]he Court should make clear now that, as a general rule, a communication is
privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of
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of current enterprise employees should be permitted under DR 7-104(A)(1)
"concerning their knowledge of factual matters outside the scope of their
employment." The committee offered as an example the situation in which

an employee happens to observe an incident at work "over which he had
neither responsibility nor authority such as an accident at the site of his

employer." In other words, in those limited circumstances, the employee is
merely a fortuitous witness1 9 to an occurrence in which he was not involved
and over which he has no control, responsibility or authority. In no agency
or evidentiary sense is such an employee the alter ego of the corporation,

although it should be noted that the mere fact of his employment by a
corporate defendant may cause the court or jury to give any testimony

which is adverse to his employer greater weight than it might otherwise
receive, one of the reasons the New York City Bar Association was willing
to treat other employees as "parties"

for discovery purposes. Nevertheless,

when one attempts to balance the interests involved, it would seem that
neither the policy considerations which underlie the privilege nor the requirements of effective representation by counsel suggest that ex parte
contacts with such employees should be deemed unethical. In other words,
the right to free access to strictly factual witnesses who are not party
representatives for any purpose arguably predominates over the enterprise's

interest in avoiding distortion of testimony by a witness who also happens
to be its employee. The balance would tip the other way, in favor of the
enterprise, if the witness' testimony were to go beyond what he observed

or be legally binding on the employer; for example, testimony that the
conduct observed was violative of company policies and procedures would
only be permissible if such policies and procedures were within the employee's knowledge and responsibility as an employee. If these prerequisites were
satisfied, the testimony would arguably constitute an admission by a party,

thereby bringing into play the considerations which led the New York City
80
Bar Association to conclude ex parte contacts would be improper.

the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of
employment." Id. (emphasis added). See also In Re Coordinated Pre-trial Proceedings, 658
F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that conversations with former employees may
be protected by the attorney-client privilege), and Porter v. Arco Metals, 642 F. Supp. 1116,
1118 (D. Mont. 1986) (holding that term "party" included those "present or former employees
with managerial responsibilities concerning the matter in litigation").
79. See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (conversations that "fortuitous witness" has with enterprise counsel would not be
protected by attorney-client privilege); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d
487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). In
Harper & Row Publishers, the Seventh Circuit stated that the attorney-client privilege does
not protect "the communications of employees about matters as to which they are virtually
indistinguishable from bystander witnesses...." Id. at 491. See generally Note, Beyond
Upjohn: Achieving Certainty by Expanding the Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 50 FoanHImA L. REv. 1182, 1206-07 (1982) (discussing the fortuitous witness exception
to the attorney-client privilege).
80. Inasmuch as the theoretical justification for allowing ex parte contact with a fortuitous

1987]

EX PARTE INTERVIEWS

1205

The more difficult analytical problem arises from the fact that the
committee also interpreted DR 7-104(A)(1) to permit interviews of former

enterprise employees. The committee simply concluded, without any real
analysis, that "former employees are no longer part of the corporate client

entity. Moreover, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D),

Federal Rules of Evidence,

statements of former employees would not be an admission since the
employer-employee relationship has ended."' The committee did not even

consider whether and, if so, to what extent communications between counsel
for the enterprise and former employees might be protected by the attorneyclient privilege.

Likewise, the committee did not consider the fact that the

witness is that he or she is not a party or its representative, it might be improper and unethical
for adverse counsel to argue or suggest to the finder of fact that such a witness' testimony is
entitled to greater or special weight because of the employment relationship. See Frey v. Dept.
of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In Frey, the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York rejected the argument that plaintiff's counsel should be
permitted to interview a government agency's employees because their statements might be
admissions usable in court against the government. Id. at 38. The Frey court stated that
plaintiff's counsel "cannot have it both ways since the employees will not be deemed by this
court to be non-parties for purposes of DR 7-104, but 'parties' for purposes of Federal Rules
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Suffice it to say that the SSA employees who may be reached by
cx parte contact are not considered agents of the SSA with authority to 'bind' the agency
under DR 7-104, or capable of making admissions on behalf of the SSA under the Federal
Rules of Evidence." Id. Although the court applied the "managing authority" test to define
the types of government employees with whom plaintiff would be permitted ex parte contact,
the court also held that those persons who "could make admissions on behalf of the SSA"
would be excluded from ex parte contact. Id., cf. Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp.,
110 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass. 1986). See generally Note, DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility Applied to the Government Party, 61 Mn, . L. REv. 1007 (1977) (discussing
DR 7-104 as it applies to a government party).
As in the case of the alter ego rule, any rule which permits ex parte contacts with some
employees of an enterprise will inevitably allow a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty to exist,
with all of the attendant difficulties and ethical dilemmas for counsel. For example, the Bar
Association of the City of New York concluded that DR 7-104(A)(1) may prohibit a lawyer
or anyone acting on his behalf from even listening to a voluntary disclosure by an employee
of an adverse party even when the employee has initiated the contact. See Opinion 80-46,
supra note 66. Opinion 80-46 further cautioned that in the case of those enterprise employees
who may be interviewed ex parte, certain disclosures must be made. See DR 1-102(A)(4) and
New York City Opinion 80-519(A). "The interviewer should disclose to the employee (1) who
the interviewer represents; (2) the fact that the information is sought in connection with
litigation; (3) a description of the dispute; and (4) the fact that any disclosure is voluntary."
See also Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 38; cf. Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271
(2d Cir. 1975).
81. Opinion 80-46, supra note 66.
82. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring). As then Chief Justice
Burger suggested in his concurring opinion in Upjohn, the logic of the Supreme Court's
opinion in that case suggests that extension of the protection of the attorney-client privilege
to communications with former employees is entirely appropriate under certain circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit has held that conversations between counsel for a corporation and the
corporation's former employees may be protected by the attorney-client privilege even though
the attorneys do not represent the former employees. See In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355, 1361, n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982). The Ninth
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enterprise continues to be exposed to potential liability when the subject of
controversy arises out of or relates to conduct or statements by a former
employee during the course of employment. As a practical matter, just as
in the case of a current employee, effective representation of the enterprise
requires that its attorney be free to communicate with such a former
employee subject to the protection of the attorney-client privilege and that

discovery be obtained from the former employee with enterprise counsel
present. If ex parte contacts by adverse counsel are improper in the case

of a current employee whose conduct or statements while employed might
be deemed to be a party admission, or might give rise to liability on the
part of the enterprise, the fortuity that the employment relationship has
subsequently terminated is irrelevant to the continuing need for and the
requirements of effective representation. 3

Circuit in PretrialProceedings based its conclusion on the Upjohn rationale:
Upjohn reversed the Third Circuit's "control group" test for the scope of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. It held that information concerning
potential violations transmitted by Upjohn's current employees to corporate counsel
was privileged.
Although Upjohn was specifically limited to current employees, 101 S. 'Ct. at
685, n. 3, the same rationale applies to the ex-employees (and current employees)
involved in this case. Former employees, as well as current employees, may possess
the relevant information needed by corporatecounsel to advise the client with respect
to actual or potentialdifficulties. See id. at 683. Again, the attorney-clientprivilege
is served by the certainty that conversations between the attorney and client will
remain privileged after the employee leaves. Although no findings were made, it is
clear that at least some of the conversations referred to by the district court were
made to counsel for the companies in order to secure legal advice for the company.
The orientation sessions undoubtedly provided information which will be used by
corporate counsel in advising the companies how to handle the pending lawsuit.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
83. Several commentators have made the same point. See Glekel, Upjohn's Effect on
Application of Attorney-Client Privilege and of Work Product Doctrine, N.Y.U. L.J., Feb.
24, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
Former employees are just as likely as present employees to possess information
needed by the corporation's lawyers to adequately advise the corporate client concerning matters which arose during the term of their former employment. Moreover,
the termination of their employment does not terminate the corporation's liability
for any misdeed they may have committed during their employment.
See also Pitt, "The Upjohn Decision: To Thine Own Self Be True," Legal Times of
Washington, Jan. 25, 1981, at 20, col. 1. The author notes that "it seems analytically untenable
the same as communications between current employees and counsel for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege. Information sought from a former employee almost invariably will
be limited to matters within the scope of the former employee's employment and will be
utilized for exactly the same purposes as information sought from existing employees." Id. at
21, col. 4.
If a former employee may be treated as a "party" or "party representative" for purposes
of the attorney-client privilege, and if the acts or statements while employed of a former
employee may be treated as those of a "party," consistency and fairness suggest the former
employee also be treated as a party for discovery purposes. See Porter v. Arco Metals, 642
F. Supp. 116 (D. Mont. 1986).
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The opinion of the New York City Bar Association was soon followed
by a similar opinion by the Massachusetts Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Ethics. In its Opinion No. 82-7, the Massachusetts Committee
concluded that "a lawyer may not interview current employees of a corporate
defendant without the consent of opposing counsel under DR 7-104(A)(1)
when the proposed interview concerns matters within the scope of the
employees' employment but may interview current employees about other
matters." 84 The Massachusetts committee approved the rationale of the New
York City Bar's Opinion 80-46 and stated:
Although there are countervailing interests in the desire of the
adverse party to obtain evidence, these considerations have already
been weighed in the formulation of the rule, which specifically
subordinates this need to the need to protect a lay party from
unsupervised communications with its opponent's counsel.85
However, like the New York City Bar, the Massachusetts Bar also
concluded that the rationale for DR 7-104(A)(1), that is, the need for
effective representation by counsel, requires only that the rule be applied
to present and not to former employees. "The reason is that former
employees enjoy no present agency relationship that is being served by the
representation of corporate counsel." ' 6 Like New York City, Massachusetts
ignored the logical consequences of its own holding when it brushed aside
the fact that an enterprise's liability or defense, and the need for representation, may. arise out of a past agency relationship; under those circumstances, the fact that the agency relationship has terminated will usually be
irrelevant to enterprise liability. The need for enterprise counsel to communicate freely with those whose conduct or statements during the course
of an agency relationship may give rise to liability is no less critical in a
situation when the relationship has subsequently terminated than when the
relationship continues.87 To make the protection of the attorney-client
privilege or the possibility of effective representation by counsel turn on
whether the agency relationship continues-an essentially irrelevant factrather than on the existence of the relationship at the time of the operative
events-the relevant fact-is to exalt form over substance.8"

84. Massachusetts Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 82-7 (1982).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
88. The opinion incorrectly focuses on the need of the former employee for effective
representation when, in the circumstances presented, it was the enterprise which required
representation and was being represented by counsel. It goes without saying that, if the
employee requires personal representation by counsel, enterprise counsel may provide such
representation only when the interests of the entity and the individual do not conflict. If an
actual or potential conflict exists, each should have separate counsel. See MODEL RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT, Rule 1.7 and accompanying comment.
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It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts Bar Association also
attempted to justify its conclusion with respect to former employees by
pointing to Rule 801(2)(D) of the Rules of Evidence, but like New York
failed to take into account or explain how its distinction between present
and former employees can be justified when the potential for enterprise
liability arises out of acts or statements of an employee during the existence
of the relationship. The Massachusetts Bar Association reasoned as follows:
Support for the notion that effective representation of counsel
is the touchstone for interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) is derived from
the fact that all who have considered the matter appear to agree
that the prohibition of the rule applies only to present, not former,
employees of the corporation. The reason is that former employees
enjoy no present agency relationship that is being served by the
representation of corporate counsel. Even more important, the
position we are adopting is also in accord with the law of evidence
as exemplified in Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D), which recognizes an
exception to the hearsay rule as to "a statement by his agent or
servant concerning the matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship." This
rule binds the corporation with respect to admissions by employees
far beyond the "control group" of the corporation. Thus, for
example, in litigation arising out of motor vehicle accidents it is
not uncommon that the corporate defendant has only his agent
involved, the driver, who will usually not be a management employee. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) permits the driver's admissions about the
accident to be introduced against the defendant corporation, and it
seems quite in line with the consequences to the corporation to
include the driver within the group to be covered by the prohibition
of DR 7-104(A)(1). 8 9
Because the Massachusetts Bar Association made no effort to explain
how the underlying rationale for its interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) (the
effective representation of counsel) is served by making the ability of
enterprise counsel to effectively represent his or her client turn on whether
the actors whose conduct may give rise to liability are still employed, its
analysis is incomplete and, to that extent, unsatisfactory.
Shortly after the New York City and Massachusetts Bar Associations
issued their opinions, the Ethics Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association was asked to reconsider the propriety of ex parte contacts by
opposing counsel (or counsel's investigator) with the employees of a corporation which is a party to litigation when the information sought from
the employee relates to the subject of controversy. 90 More specifically, the
committee was asked to pass upon the propriety of such ex parte contacts

89. Massachusetts Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 82-7 (1982).
90. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Formal Opinion 410 (1983).
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when the employees are not members of the so-called control group. In an
earlier informal opinion, 91 the committee had approved such ex parte
contacts. The issue presented was whether ex parte contacts with non-control
group employees was still proper after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Upjohn. In its prior informal opinion, the committee had held that ex
parte interviews with "non-management" employees were proper; 92 in a
subsequent formal opinion, the committee had found that the relevant test
was the extent to which the enterprise's employees are "closely identified
with management of the company." 93
The committee concluded that Upjohn provided additional guidance on
the issue:
Although Upjohn is not controlling, it is certainly instructive
as to whether or not the control group test should be rejected in
determining which employees constitute the "corporate party." Its
reasoning may be logically extended to ex parte contacts with a
corporate party's employee by opposing counsel for at least four
reasons.
First, the corporate employee may be prejudiced either directly
or indirectly by the ex parte contact. Second, the corporation has
an interest in seeing that information or knowledge learned by an
employee in the course of the employee's employment is not released
to a party with an interest inimical to the corporate employer
without the protection and advice of counsel. Third, due to the
difficulty of ascertaining whether an employee is acting within the
scope of his or her employment, a corporate employee might be
induced by opposing counsel into making admissions or statements
that are binding upon the corporation. Fourth, due to the difficulty
in ascertaining who is a control group member, opposing counsel
might contact a party whom he believes is not a control group
member, only to find out later that the person contacted was a
control group member, thereby rendering the contact improper.9 4
Based on its analysis of the policy considerations approved in Upjohn,
the Los Angeles committee opted for a broader rule than New York City
or Massachusetts:
The rule prohibiting ex parte contacts should be extended to all
employees of a corporate party because opposing counsel could
cause a lay employee to divulge information such as legal advice of
corporate counsel, trade secrets, or information considered attorneys' work product. If that is possible, corporate counsel is placed

91. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Informal Opinion 1976-1 (1976).

92. Id.
93. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Formal Opinion 369 (1977).
94. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Formal Opinion 410.
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at a severe disadvantage because he or she will not be able to give
confidential advice to non-control group employees without the
assurance that such information and advice would not be disclosed
during an ex parte contact with opposing counsel. This is precisely
the issue that Justice Rehnquist addressed in his opinion in Upjohn
when he stated, "the attorney and client must be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether certain discussions will be
protected." 449 U.S. at 393.

Forbidding ex parte contacts by opposing counsel with the noncontrol group employees of a corporate party furthers the ends
enunciated by Justice Rehnquist by assuring the corporation and its
counsel that privileged information will not be inadvertently disclosed to opposing counsel through that counsel's superior training
and skill. This furthers the policy of promoting frankness and
candor between corporate employees and corporate counsel. See
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 41; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-240; Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); F.R.C.P. 26(6)(3). This is especially true in light of the fact that many communications between
corporate counsel and non-control group employees involve attempts
to encourage faithful compliance with the law. Upjohn v. United
States, supra, at 392. 9Thus, while the New York City and Massachusetts Bar Associations
were willing to allow ex parte contacts with current employees with respect
to matters outside the scope of their employment, the Los Angeles Bar
Association's opinion suggests that even those limited contacts should be
prohibited. The Opinion's rationale for the broader prohibition is that "the
corporate employee may be prejudiced either directly or indirectly by the
ex parte contact." ' 96 The Los Angeles Bar was concerned that any statement
that causes injury to the corporation may in turn injure the employee by
either "endangering the employee's source of income or by jeopardizing the
employee's position at the corporation." 97 The committee, therefore, rejected
the argument that no harm can come from ex parte contacts limited to
matters outside the scope of employment.
This reasoning is flawed for the practical reason that it is difficult
for an attorney or the employee to draw precisely the line between
what is and what is not within the scope of the employee's employment. Moreover, even though the attorney might scrupulously
avoid asking questions or soliciting information within the employee's scope of employment, the employee might nevertheless volunteer

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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damaging or privileged information for which the opposing counsel
had not asked which is within the scope of the employee's employment thereby binding the corporation. Certainly, no lay employee,
especially an unsophisticated one, would be able to tell whether his
or her statements are within the scope of his or her employment. 9
Finally, the committee concluded that a "bright line" rule serves the
interests of both sides to a controversy:
[I]t is best to draw a clear and unequivocal line-opposing counsel
should not have ex parte contacts concerning a subject of controversy with the employees of a corporate party to the controversy.
This promotes the confidentiality of corporate counsel's advice and
insures opposing counsel that he or she is not making potentially
improper contacts with the opposing party. 9
In view of the potentially serious consequences for both a client and
attorney if the attorney inadvertently makes an improper contact with an
adverse party or receives information from an employee that is improper, 1 °
an unambiguous rule which prohibits ex parte contacts with all enterprise
employees has some appeal'0 1 but may run afoul of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Hickman v. Taylor.0 2 Recognition of the
98. Id.
99. Id. The opinion was based on California's version of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility; California has not yet adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Opinion 410 was followed by the San Diego Bar Association's Ethics Committee in its Opinion
1984-5. See ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, p. 555; Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312
(W.D. Mich. 1985) (citing both opinions with approval).
100. The sanctions which may be imposed upon an attorney and a client for an improper
contact with an adverse party can be severe. See, e.g., Mitton v. State Bar of California, 71
Cal.2d 525, 455 P.2d 753, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1969) (3 month suspension); Crane v. State Bar
of Calif., 30 Cal.3d 117, 635 P.2d 163, 177 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1981) (one year suspension);
Shelton v. Hess, 599 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (disqualification of counsel). Furthermore,
any information obtained as a result of an ex parte contact may be deemed inadmissible at
trial. See Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc., 110 Cal. App.3d 597, 168 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1980).
The fact that contact with a represented party is "well intended but misguided" is not a
defense. Mitton, 71 Cal.2d at 534, 455 P.2d at 758, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 654; cf. Complaint of
Korea Shipping Corp, 621 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska 1985).
101. In a related context, a number of commentators have urged the adoption of a bright
line test when applying the attorney-client privilege. See Note, Beyond Upjohn: Achieving
Certainty by Expanding the Scope of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 50 FoRDHA L.
REv. 1182, 1184-85 n.12. The author argues that "to better serve the theoretical underpinnings
of the attorney-client privilege, the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege should be
expanded to encompass the communications of all a corporation's employees." Id. at 1185.
102. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the court treated the partnership's employees as
mere witnesses and held that their statements to the defendant's attorney were therefore not
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Hickman court's distinction between witnesses
and employees is arguably dictum. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508; see also Note, Death Knell,
supra note 50, at 1069 n.125. The author argues that the Hickman court failed to recognize
that the crew members were speaking to the partnership's attorney as its employees. Id. at
1062-63 n.97. In any event, Upjohn extended the protection of the privilege to discussions
with certain enterprise employees; however, counsel's conversations with those employees who
are merely fortuitous witnesses probably remain subject to discovery.
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fortuitous witness exception, discussed supra, harmonizes the general rule
proposed with Hickman. 10 3
There is another consideration which must be factored into any rule
adopted. Generally, an attorney has a right to conduct an ex parte interview
with a non-party fact witness subject only to the witness' willingness to be
interviewed. In InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v. Edelstein,'04 the
trial court had entered an order restricting counsel for IBM's right to
conduct ex parte interviews with the government's witnesses. The Second
Circuit reversed and held that the trial court's order constituted an infringement upon the constitutional right to effective counsel.
We believe that the restrictions on interviewing set by the trial judge
exceeded his authority. They not only impair the constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel but are contrary to time-honored
and decision-honored principles, namely, that counsel for all parties
have a right to interview an adverse party's witnesses (the witness
willing) in private, without the presence or consent of opposing
counsel and without a transcript being made. 105
The rationale of InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v. Edelstein points
up the critical nature of the issues involved; both sides' right to effective
counsel must be taken into account when attempting to distinguish parties
or party representatives from mere witnesses. The failure to draw the line
at the right point, or the failure to provide reasonably clear guidelines to
counsel, may unfairly disadvantage one party or the other and, in the
process, deny that party full and effective representation of counsel.
Litigation which arose out of the MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas,
Nevada in November of 1980 both illustrates the serious difficulties which
counsel for an adverse party can encounter in attempting to conduct ex
parte interviews with individuals associated with an enterprise and provides
us with relatively rare insight into the current thinking of one appellate
court on these issues. 6 The lawsuit arose out of a dispute between the

103. The fortuitous witness exception is consistent with the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics' longstanding rule. "An attorney for the plaintiff may properly interview
employees of the defendant who are witnesses to the incident upon which the suit is based so
long as no deception is practiced and the employees are informed that the person interviewing
them is the attorney for the plaintiff." ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions,
No. 117 (1934). Opinion 117 was decided under old Canon 39, but its reasoning is equally
applicable to subsequent versions of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting lawyer from engaging in "conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation").
104. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975).
105. Id.
106. See American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel, 748 F.2d 1293 (9th
Cir. 1984) (all facts originated from this opinion). In April of 1985, the Ninth Circuit ordered
its opinion withdrawn from publication without explanation. Shortly thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court decided Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller and held that orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases are not collateral orders subject to appeal as final judgments
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MGM Grand and several of its insurers with respect to the amount of the
insurable loss suffered by the hotel. George Morris was MGM's vicepresident in charge of rebuilding the hotel. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit summarized Mr. Morris' responsibilities.
Part of his job involved working with MGM's chief executive officer
and MGM's lawyers who were negotiating with the insurance companies for payment of the loss, and analyzing the construction costs
and developing litigation positions.
Although Morris resigned as vice-president of MGM in April
1982, he signed a consulting agreement with MGM that required
him to continue to supervise construction and to assist in litigation.
In such capacity, he continued to work with the MGM lawyers in
preparation for litigation and, was privy to confidential information
regarding the litigation. His consulting duties included such sensitive
tasks as helping to draft interrogatories, assisting counsel at depositions, and advising generally on the conduct of the case. In answer
to an interrogatory, MGM designated Morris as its only expert
witness. 07
Morris subsequently became unhappy with his relationship with MGM
and hired separate counsel to represent him to negotiate a possible employment agreement with one of the hotel's insurers. 0 8 Morris' individual
attorney then initiated contact with one of the attorneys for the insurance
company, and the insurer's attorney subsequently met with Morris and his
attorney as requested. According to the Ninth Circuit:
At this time Morris assured Cozen [the insurer's attorney] that he
was represented by separate counsel, but also disclosed that he was
still employed by MGM. Notwithstanding Cozen's expressed concern
that he must avoid ethical violations, he proceeded to discuss many
matters regarding the litigation, including the theories of opposing
counsel.109
As a result of Cozen's discussions with Morris, the trial court ordered
Cozen and his law firm disqualified from further representation of the

within the meaning of 28 U.S. Code § 1291. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,
424 (1985). The Ninth Circuit then dismissed the appeal from the trial court's disqualification
order. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel, 765 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1985).
Although the opinion was withdrawn from publication, presumably on a procedural point,
and, therefore, is not precedent, the court's reasoning is nevertheless instructive, and prudent

attorneys will not ignore the court's analysis. Because the opinion has been withdrawn from
publication, all citations are to the Ninth Circuit's slip opinion unless otherwise indicated
[hereinafter "slip opinion"]. The District Court's opinion, which is consistent with the Ninth
Circuit's analysis, can be found on L~as, Genfed Library, Dist. File (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 1983).
107. Slip Op. at 2, 3.

108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 3-4.
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insurance company, even though Cozen's firm had conducted (or attended)
more than 200 depositions, had reviewed more than 1,000,000 documents,
had expended over 15,000 hours on the matter and its contacts occurred
less than two months before the case had been scheduled to go to trial.' 10
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order of disqualification.
The focus of the district court's and this court's concern is Cozen's
participation in a scheme to secure confidential information from
MGM-some of which MGM had a right to protect under the
attorney-client privilege and other information which George Morris
as a confidential employee had a legal duty not to divulge."'
The court's affirmance was based in part on its analysis and extension
of the Upjohn rationale.
Cozen's contacting Morris after learning Morris' identity and
the nature of the discussions between the two demonstrate Cozen's
improper conduct in engaging in a knowing and willing receipt of
attorney-client confidences that MGM was entitled to protect under
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B). ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B) (1969). (Footnote omitted.) Communications between a corporation's counsel and the corporation's employees
in preparation for litigation are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
The corporation may claim this privilege and such communications
are immune from discovery. See In re Coordinated PretrialProceedings, 658 F.2d at 1361. A fortiori such communications may
not be the subject of ex parte contacts, for a corollary of the
attorneys' duty not to reveal confidences of a client is the duty not
to seek to cause another to do so. See Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101(D); DR 7-104; EC 4-1; EC 4-6.112

110. Appellant's Brief at 4, American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel, Nos.
83-2674 and 83-2728. It should be noted that the district court made an express finding that
Cozen's conduct did not involve any intentional wrongdoing. See the District Court's opinion,
American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel, No. CIV-LV-82-26, Slip Op. at 6 (D.
Nev. Dec. 8, 1983).
111. According to the Ninth Circuit, "George Morris wore many hats. Morris was a
litigation consultant to MGM, a former corporate officer of MGM, a fact witness, a trial
expert designated as such by MGM under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A), and a
non-testifying expert designated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B)." Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 11-12. The ethical issues in MGM Hotel were decided under the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) and its amendments. Rule 4-101 of the Model Code
provides:
DR 4-101
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
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In other words, the Ninth Circuit held that it was ethically improper
for adverse counsel to participate in ex parte contacts with an employee
who had communications with enterprise counsel that were protected by the
attorney-client privilege;"' the fact that the employee was represented by
his personal attorney was irrelevant, as was the fact the contact was initiated
4
by the employee's attorney."
The court held that counsel acted improperly when they became parties
to a breach of their opponent's employee's obligation of confidentiality.

disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client.
The Ninth Circuit in MGM Hotel concluded that it is unethical for an attorney to even
talk with or "negotiate" with an employee of an adverse party who is in possession of
information protected by the attorney-client privilege. MGM Hotel, Slip Op. at 16-17 ("the
mere act of negotiating was unethical").
113. For years ethics opinions have ignored the relevance of the attorney-client privilege
to the propriety of ex parte contacts with enterprise employees. See Tennessee Bar Assoc.
Opinion 83-F-46(b); cf. Virginia Bar Assoc. Op. 459 (1982). ("It may be appropriate to express
the issue in terms of those as to whom the attorney-client privilege would be available,"
suggesting that the inquiring attorney consider the application of Upjohn). U.S. District Court
Judge Weinstein noted in United States v. Jamil that the prohibition against ex parte contacts
with a party represented by counsel has several purposes: "The rule is crafted to protect a
client from squandering a possible claim or defense and to insure against disclosure of privileged
information." United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
114. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in MGM Hotel is of interest:
Cozen also violated DR 7-104(A)(1) which prohibits ex parte contacts with a
party known to be represented by counsel. Cozen contacted Morris while Morris
was still employed by MGM. Though MGM was represented by counsel Cozen made
no attempt to contact MGM's counsel prior to or even after his meetings with
Morris. INA argues that this rule is not applicable because Morris was separately
represented by counsel. Its argument fails because Bongiovanni's representation was
for the purposes of negotiating a contract for Morris, not for the purposes of
representing or protecting MGM's interests. Disciplinary Rule 7-104 states that a
lawyer shall not "[c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject
of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party .... ." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104. Cozen did not
secure the permission of MGM's attorney, who was Morris's attorney for the purposes
of that matter. Morris was not separately named in the lawsuit and was a party
only in the sense of his employment and former employment by MGM. Given our
conclusion that ex parte contacts are prohibited with such persons, it follows that
MGM's counsel is the one who must, and the only one who can, protect MGM's
confidences.
Slip Op. at p. 21, note 11. The result would probably be the same under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL. CONDUCT, Rule 4.2 Comment
(1983). The Comment to Rule 4.2sallows counsel to interview an employee who is subject to
the Rule without enterprise counsel's consent in one circumstance. Id. The comment provides:
If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or
her own counsel, the consent of that counsel to a communication will be sufficient
for purposes of this rule. (Emphasis added.)
Cf. Meat Price Investigators v. Iowa Beef Processors, 448 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa, 1977), aff'd
on appeal, 572 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Moreover, Cozen and his firm violated other ethical obligations
when they induced or participated in the breach of their opponent's
employee's obligations of confidentiality. George Morris was a
confidential employee of MGM. Although he was not a lawyer
himself, and was not bound by the lawyer's ethical rules, this is
not to say that he did not have legal obligations of fidelity to his
employer or that Cozen, as a lawyer, did not have ethical obligations
with regard to contacting him. In Los Angeles County Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 410 (March 14, 1983), the ethics
committee addressed these obligations and advised that it was not
proper for counsel or its investigator to contact exparte an employee
of a corporation that is a party to a suit knowing that the information sought relates to a subject of controversy. The committee
engaged in a careful and thorough analysis of Upjohn and said that
it applied to such a situation in order to "promote frankness and
candor between corporate employees and corporate counsel." The
committee cited as an additional reason the fact that such employees
have the authority to bind the corporation by making admissions
about acts or facts within the scope of their employment. See Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Although the committee's broad condemnation
went to all employee ex parte contacts, we need only decide there
that contact with Morris, a confidential and highly placed employee
of MGM, is clearly prohibited." 5
Of particular interest, the Ninth Circuit stated that even if Morris could
be fairly categorized as a former employee, that would not change its
analysis.
We are not persuaded by appellants' argument that Morris was
fair game for ex parte discovery because his consulting contract
specifically negated his authority to bind MGM. When Morris made
his contact with Cozen, he was a former confidential employee, a
confidential consultant and a member of MGM's litigating team
for this case. (Footnote omitted.) Even had Morris resigned before

115. Slip opinion at 12. As the Ninth Circuit in MGM Hotel explained:
The main policy behind the Upjohn rule and the L.A. County Bar Opinion is
to protect a client's confidences. Cozen was prohibited from contacting Morris as
an MGM employee; similar conduct has subjected counsel to discipline. See Mahoning
County Bar Association v. Ruffalo, 199 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ohio) (attorney disbarred
for paying employee of party opponent to prepare suit against employer), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964) (discussed in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 [1968]);
see also Esser v. A.H. Robins Co., 537 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1982) (law firm
disqualified for hiring employee of party opponent's insurer to investigate case);
New York Bar Association Opinion No. 503 (February 1, 1979) (a "lawyer [can]
not undertake to cause another's employee to divulge information protected by

Canon 4").
Slip opinion at 22, n.12.

1987]

EX PARTE INTER VIEWS

1217

making contact with Cozen, our analysis would not be altered.
116
(Footnote omitted.)
The MGM Hotel panel affirmed the reasoning of its earlier decision,
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, in which the Ninth Circuit had
refused to draw a distinction between current employees and former employees:
In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, we held that the
Upjohn rationale applied to ex-employees as well:
Former employees, as well as current employees, may possess
the relevant information needed by corporate counsel to advise
the client with respect to actual or potential difficulties....
Again, the attorney-client privilege is served by the certainty
that conversations between the attorney and client will remain
privileged after the employee leaves. 658 F.2d at 1361 n.7
(citation omitted). Matters that Morris discussed with corporate counsel before he left MGM were privileged, and Cozen
7
should not have sought to invade that privilege."1
In the MGM Hotel case, the Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that the
contacts by the attorney for the insurance company with Morris might have
been appropriate if, but only if, "Morris in fact brought to Cozen evidence
of on-going fraud on the part of MGM.""' However, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Morris had no evidence of past fraud let alone evidence of
a continuing or future fraud." 9
The court also summarily rejected the argument that because Morris
was a fact witness, the adverse party had a constitutional right to interview
him ex parte. The court pointed out that the adverse parties had a right to
take his deposition to obtain "all properly discoverable information within
his knowledge or control."'12
Although the facts of the case were somewhat unusual, the principle
on which the MGM Hotel case was decided is well established. Other courts

116. Slip opinion at 12-13. Cf. Wisconsin Bar Assoc. Op. E-82-10 (1982) (holding that
even a "former managing agent" of a corporation can be contacted by counsel for adverse
party). The committee did caution that in conducting such an interview "the attorney should
first apprise the former employee that he or she may have a continuing duty to the corporation

not to reveal any confidential information which he or she may have acquired during the
course of his or her employment by the corporation." Wisconsin Bar Assoc. Op. E-82-10
(1982).
117. Slip opinion at 23, n.13.

118. Id.at 13.
119. Id. The Ninth Circuit in MGM Hotel held that to invoke the crime or fraud
exception, "the party seeking disclosure ... must make out a prima facie case that the
attorney was retained in order to promote intended continuing criminal or fraudulent activity."

Id.
120. Id. at 14. See also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
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have recognized that an improper contact with an adverse party strikes at
the foundation of our adversary system because it interferes with the ability
of an attorney to effectively represent the client. For example, in Mitton v.
State Bar, the California Supreme Court noted the critical interests involved
and imposed a three month suspension on an attorney who claimed that
his contact with an adverse party was the result of an innocent mistake.
Rule 12 of the Rules of Professional Conduct reads in pertinent part:
"A member of the state bar shall not communicate with a party
represented by counsel upon a subject of controversy, in the absence
and without the consent of such counsel." This rule is necessary to
the preservation of the attorney-client relationship and the proper
functioning of the administration of justice and was designed to
prevent acts such as those engaged in here by petitioner. It shields
the opposing party not only from an attorney's approaches which
are intentionally improper, but, in addition, from approaches which
are well intentioned but misguided.
The rule was designed to permit an attorney to function adequately in his proper role and to prevent the opposing attorney
from impeding his performance in such role. If a party's counsel
is present when an opposing attorney communicates with a party,
counsel can easily correct any element of error in the communication
or correct the effect of the communication by calling attention to
counteracting elements which may exist. Consequently, before any
direct communication is made with the opposing party, consent of
the opposing attorney is required. 12'
IV.

THE MODEL RULEs OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT: AN EXPANDED
DEFINITION OF A PARTY FOR DISCOVERY PURPosEs

After much criticism of the ethical ambiguities and dilemmas created
by varying interpretations of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,' 22 the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional

121. Mitton v. State Bar of Calif., 71 Cal.2d 525, 534, 455 P.2d 753, 758, 78 Cal. Rptr.
649, 654 (1969) (emphasis added). The cases have identified at least four policy reasons for
the rule prohibiting ex parte contacts with a party represented by counsel: (1) to prevent an
attorney from taking unfair advantage of one who is represented by counsel, In re Atwell,
232 Mo. App. 186, 115 S.W.2d 527 (1938); (2) to prevent a party from inadvertently making
statements that could prejudice his case at trial, Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal.3d 603, 510 P.2d
719, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973); (3) to prevent distortion of a party's testimony, Mitton v.
State Bar of Calif., supra; and (4) to prevent an inadvertent or intentional invasion of the
attorney-client privilege, American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel, supra.
122. See Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and ProfessionalAspirations, 30 CIavw. ST.
L. REv. 571, 572 (1981). In arguing for the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
Professor Hazard characterized the Code of Professional Responsibility as "disastrous." Id.
According to Hazard, the Code "has come to contain two potential rules governing the same
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Conduct in 1983.'2

As late as 1981, when the proposed final draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was circulated by the American Bar Association's

Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, the comment to Rule
12
4.2124 adopted an alter ego approach rather than a functional approach
to ex parte contacts with an adverse party. The draft comment provided in

relevant part:
This rule prohibits communication concerning the matter in repre-

sentation by a lawyer for one party with managing agents of a
party that is a corporation or organization, for such persons speak

for the organization. It does not prohibit communication with lower
echelon employees who are not representatives of the organization.
Whether a specific employee is a representative of a client can
depend on the circumstances, particularly whether the employee has

significant managerial responsibility in the matter in question.26
The proposed final draft correctly noted that the suggested rule remained
substantially identical to the interpretation placed on DR 7-104(A)(1) by
most authorities. '27
Although the text of Rule 4.2 itself remained unchanged in the final
draft, the comment to the rule was significantly modified. The portion of
the comment quoted above was deleted and in its place the following was
added:
In the case of an organization, this rule prohibits communications
by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in
connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may
lawyer conduct (and sometimes three potential rules)." Id. at 573. Hazard also refers to these
conflicting rules as "legal double-speak." Id. at 573. Professor Hazard correctly notes that
"a lawyer should not have to operate under inherent moral peril with a rule system that is
inherently ambiguous." Id. at 574.
123. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, p. 01:101 (1987).
124. See MODEL RULEs OF PRO-SsIONAL CONDUCT ER 4.2 (1981). ER 4.2 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct provides that:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to do so.
125. A functional approach to ex parte contacts takes into account the requirements of
effective representation by counsel in light of the purposes underlying the attorney-client
privilege and the agency and evidentiary burdens imposed on a party by our legal system.
126. See Comment to Rule 4.2, Proposed Final Draft, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, As Revised Through May 1981 (American Bar Association, Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 1981).
127. Id.
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constitute an admission on the part of the organization.'u
In other words, the revised and final version of the comment, which
was approved by the ABA in 1983, adopts a three pronged approach which
combines alter ego and functional concepts. The comment identifies at least
three situations in which an attorney's ex parte communications with an
adverse party's employees will be deemed to be improper.
1. When the employee has "managerial responsibility." The comment
does not define the phrase managerial responsibility, but this appears to be
the Model Rule's effort to incorporate the old alter ego test which looked
to the nature or level of the employees' authority within the corporation.
As we have seen, a variety of interpretations have been placed upon the
"managerial" expression of the alter ego rule. Some courts and bar associations have looked to the office or position held by the employee and
have not inquired further to determine whether the employee has actual
knowledge of, or responsibility for the subject matter of the dispute. 2 9
Others have focused on the employee's actual authority with respect to
settlement or resolution of the matter in controversy. 30 The intent of the
comment to ER 4.2 in this regard is not clear. However, under a functional
approach all employees who have knowledge or information gained in their
capacity as employees, or who could speak for the enterprise in any relevant
sense would be treated as parties for discovery purposes. The next two
categories, which were added to the final draft, include those employees
whose conduct or statements will be relevant to resolution of the matter in
dispute.
2. Those whose acts or omissions are relevant to enterprise liability,
whether civil or criminal. In essence, this prohibition recognizes that, under
the law of agency, certain employees' conduct will be deemed to be that of
the adverse party for purposes of determining liability and that, as a matter
of consistency and fairness, such individuals should be treated as parties
for discovery purposes. The comment does not distinguish between those
whose agency or employment relationship continues at the time of discovery,
but instead focuses on the existence of the relationship at the time of the
events in question, which is the relevant point in time for purposes of
analyzing enterprise liability for an employee's acts or omissions.' Thus,
the rule properly turns on the relevant aspect of the relationship rather than
on whether the relationship continues as of the date of discovery or trial,
which is usually irrelevant.

128. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2, Model Code
Comparison, p. 01:157 (1987).
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50
Ill. App.2d 52, 58, 199 N.E. 2d 802, 806 (1964).
131. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 comment (1987). The comment
refers not merely to "employees" but "to any other person";' presumably, this would include
former employees.
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3. Those whose statements may constitute an admission on the part of
the enterprise. This aspect of the rule recognizes that, under the rules of
evidence, the statements of certain employees made during the existence of
the relationship will be deemed to be those of a party and, as a matter of
consistency, those employees are also treated as parties for discovery purposes. Again, whether the employment relationship continues appears to
be-and should be-irrelevant.
Although the text of Rule 4.2 expressly prohibits contact with those
whom "the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter," the accompanying comments unfortunately limit by implication
the concept of a "party" to agency and evidentiary considerations. While
these concepts are essential to an analysis of the requirements of effective
representation by counsel, the policy considerations underlying the attorneyclient privilege are at least as important. Although it appears that the
modification of the comment to ER 4.2, which occurred shortly after Upjohn
was decided, was influenced by the United States Supreme Court's analysis
of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, Rule 4.2 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not make it clear that adverse
counsel's communications with any employee of an organization who may
have privileged communications with enterprise counsel could be unethical.

ER 4.2 (the counterpart of DR 7-104[A][1]) must be read with ER 1.6(a)

2

(the counterpart of DR 4-101[B]) in order to fully appreciate the limitations
placed on counsel's ex parte contacts with the employees of an enterprise.
In other words, only by a careful analysis of the Model Rules, recent court

decisions, and the opinions of the bar associations, will a lawyer come to
realize that the three categories of employees expressly enumerated in the
comment to ER 4.2 are not necessarily exhaustive.'

132. ER 1.6(a) provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs
(b), (c) and (d) or ER 3.3(a)(2).
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in MGM Hotel, ...
a corollary
of the attorneys' duty not to reveal confidences of a client is the duty not to seek to cause
another to do so." See Slip Opinion, supra note 106, at 11-12.
133. Several courts have recently rejected the argument that ex parte contacts should not
be permitted in the case of employees who participated in attorney-client privileged communications with enterprise counsel. See Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103
Wash.2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984). The Washington Supreme Court held in Wright that, under
the Code of Professional Conduct, adverse counsel could communicate ex parte with current
employees of a health maintenance organization unless the employees had managing authority
sufficient to give them the right to speak for the corporation. Id. at 201, 691 P.2d at 569.
The Wright court also permitted ex parte contacts with former employees. Id. The Wright
court stated that it could "find no reason to distinguish between employees who, in fact,
witnessed an event and those whose act or omission caused the event leading to the action."
Id. Furthermore, the Wright court held that even though a corporate employee might be a
"client" for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege, the employee need not necessarily
be treated as a "party" for purposes of the disciplinary rule prohibiting ex parte contacts with
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For example, in the Upjohn case, the employees and former employees
interviewed by counsel for the company were not necessarily individuals
who themselves participated in illegal activities. Employees who might have
had knowledge of illegal activities by others were also interviewed, and the
Supreme Court held that their communications with counsel were privileged.
While an employee with knowledge of illegal conduct by other employees
might not fall in any one of the three categories of employees enumerated
in the comment to ER 4.2, nevertheless, because their communications with
enterprise counsel may be deemed to be privileged, any effort by opposition
counsel to discover such communications would be improper. 3 4 In other

adverse parties. Id. at 202, 691 P.2d at 570. Although the risk of inadvertent or intentional
disclosure of privileged information in an ex parte interview is a real one, the Wright court
seemed to take at face value the argument made by plaintiff's attorney that he did not intend
to intrude into privileged communications between the defendant's attorney and its employees,
but only sought to discover underlying facts. See also Frey v. Dept. of Health and Human
Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Frey also was decided under the Code of
Professional Conduct, and the District Court for the Eastern District of New York accepted
plaintiff's counsel's agreement "not to question employees about communications
they made to defendant's counsel in this case." Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 38. Frey adopted the
Wright court's definition of a party and authorized plaintiff's counsel to make ex parte contacts
with the employees of a government agency which was a defendant in the case unless the
employees were individuals who could "bind it to a decision or settle controversies on its
behalf." Id. The court concluded that "at least the high level managerial employees who
participated in the decision not to promote plaintiff fall within that category." Id. at 35.
Although the court agreed with the Wright court's definition of a party, that is, an employee
who had "authority to bind the corporation," the Frey court concluded that "there is even
stronger reason to construe the term 'party' in DR 7-104 narrowly in this case, where the
defendant is a government employer." Id. at 37. The court noted that "unlike a corporate
party, the government also has a duty to advance the public's interest in achieving justice, an
ultimate obligation that outweighs its narrower interest in prevailing in a lawsuit." Id.
The courts generally seem to take a somewhat more restrictive view of the term "party"
when a governmental entity is involved. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 960-61 (2d Cir. 1983); Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593 (D.
Mass. 1977), cf. Belcher v. Bassett Furniture, 588 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1978).
134. See MGM Hotel, supra note 106, slip op. at 10-22, and authorities cited in
court's opinion. See also Mills Land and Water Company v. Golden West Refining Company,
230 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1986). The Mills court held that ex parte contact with a member of the
opposing party's board of directors supported disqualification of the offending attorney. The
court's rationale was that such an ex parte contact interfered with the ability of corporate
counsel to effectively represent the client. ("Corporations enjoy an attorney-client privilege.
[Citation omitted.] The question is not simply whether Wynn was in a position to bind Mills
in some fashion. His position makes him potentially privy to privileged information about the
litigation. To establish a 'flexible' rule permitting ex parte communication absent a court order
would seriously undercut the ability of corporate counsel to represent their client. [Citation
omitted.") Id. at 467. The court cited Formal Opinion 410 of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association with approval to support its holding. The court also held that the rationale for a
rule prohibiting ex parte contacts with, enterprise representatives is the preservation of the
attorney-client relationship and the proper functioning of the administration of justice. Id. at
468. Finally, the court concluded that it is improper for an attorney to make a unilateral
decision with respect to the application of the rule prohibiting ex parte contacts with an adverse
party when employees of the corporation are involved. Id. at 469.
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words, these employees should be deemed to be "represented by another
lawyer in the matter" for purposes of analyzing the propriety of ex parte
communications by adverse counsel. This is true whether the Model Code
or the Model Rules govern the propriety of the proposed contact with an
enterprise employee. 35
Although it can be argued that a broader prohibition on ex parte
contacts with enterprise employees will make it more difficult for adverse
counsel to develop favorable information because the mere presence of
enterprise counsel may affect the testimony which an employee is willing to
give, there are at least three responses to that argument. First, the situation
in which adverse counsel would have to labor is no different than that
which confronts counsel when dealing with an individual party. Second, if
an enterprise's employees are the representatives through whom it acts and
speaks, fairness requires that its representatives receive the same benefit of
the advice and protection of counsel as is afforded individuals; only in this
way is the enterprise itself effectively represented by counsel. 136 Third, there
is no reason why adverse counsel ought to have an advantage when dealing
with enterprise representatives that is not available when dealing with
individuals who are adverse. While representation of enterprise employees
by counsel will probably mean that their testimony will be presented in a
light which is more favorable than would have been the case without
representation, the provision of such assistance is one of the legitimate roles
which attorneys play in our adversary system1 37 If assisting with telling the
client's story in the most favorable light possible consistent with truth and
accuracy is one of the honorable functions which able counsel fills when
representing an individual, why should an enterprise and its spokesmen be
deprived of the same kind of representation? While some will no doubt
fear that a few attorneys will suborn perjury by enterprise employees, that
is a risk which exists in any case involving the attorney-client relationship.
Our rules of professional conduct must be based on the assumption
that attorneys will conduct themselves in an ethical fashion and that, while
as in the case of an individual client, the attorney will seek to assist in
presenting truthful testimony in the most favorable light possible, attorneys
will not suborn perjury. 38 When one balances the interests involved, the
legitimate need by all parties for representation by counsel should predom135. Upjohn was decided under the Model Code, as was the MGM Hotel case. Cf. Wright
by Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wash.2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984) (also decided
under the Model Code).
136. See Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 310. AS Professor Saltzburg notes, one of the dangers
associated with a lack of representation is that when an employee is asked a leading question
by skilled counsel during the course of an interview, "they may make statements that they
really do not intend." Id.
137. See Mitton v. State Bar of Calif., 71 Cal.2d 525, 455 P.2d 753, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1969) and New York City Bar Association Opinion 80-46.
138. See panel discussion, "Current Issues in Attorney-Client Relationship," 36 The
Business Lawyer 571, 595. All of our rules of ethical conduct assume that the overwhelming
majority of lawyers are honest and will seek to comply with the standards of conduct prescribed.
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inate over the possibility of abuse of the attorney-client relationship by a
few. l39 A broader rule recognizes that both the enterprise and society as a
whole have an interest in the effective representation of counsel and that,
in the case of an enterprise, effective representation requires that its attorneys
be free to both receive and deliver information to and counsel those
employees who may be deemed to speak for the corporation in any relevant
sense, or who may act for the corporation in defending its interests or
attempting to comply with the law.
It is significant that the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct
expressly authorize counsel to request that the employees of a client not
talk with opposition counsel. Rule 3.4(F) provides in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not:

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent
of a client;140 ...
This is significant for several reasons. First, the rule implicitly recognizes
that enterprise employees generally are not mere witnesses but are representatives of a party who should be treated as parties for discovery purposes.
Secondly, it legitimizes efforts by counsel to protect enterprise employees
from ex parte discovery and sanctions counsel's efforts to limit discovery
to those formal procedures which must be employed by adverse counsel
when dealing with a party.1 41 Third, the rule will result in competent counsel
139. See Saltzburg, supra note 9. As Professor Saltzburg notes:
The attorney-client privilege represents a policy judgment that clients should be
encouraged to seek legal advice and that lawyers should be fully and completely
informed by their clients when rendering that advice.
Id. at 283.
140. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, pp. 01:149-01:150 (emphasis
supplied).
141. The rule was not free from doubt under earlier versions of our rules of professional
conduct. The ABA recognized in Formal Opinion No. 131 that it is improper for an attorney
to attempt to influence any person "other than his clients or their employees" to refuse to
give information to opposing counsel. (Opinion No. 131 was decided under Canon 39 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.) However, some courts took a different view. See Wright by
Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wash.2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984). It is interesting to
note that Rule 3.4(F) makes no distinction between employees who may be fortuitous witnesses
and employees who may be deemed to act or speak for the corporation in some sense. Likewise,
the rule does not address the problem of former employees, but seems to refer only to those
who .are current employees. The failure to make the first distinction may unfairly deprive
adverse counsel of the right to interview mere witnesses; the failure to make the second could
effectively deprive the enterprise of representation when its liability or defense turns on the
conduct or statements of a former employee that occurred while employed. Presumably,
counsel for an enterprise could properly give a similar instruction to any person who falls
within the ambit of ER 4.2. See HAzARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYEEiNG: A HANDaooc
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 382; pp. 384-85; pp. 435-36; Illustrative

Case (b) (1986). See also MODEL RULEs

OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 comment (1987).
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automatically issuing a request to all enterprise employees that they not
participate in ex parte contacts by adverse counsel, thereby effectively putting
into place the limitation on such contacts which a functional rule would
mandate as a matter of professional ethics.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A functional approach to the definition of a "party" for discovery
purposes should not become entangled in the debate over the scope to be
given to the attorney-client privilege when dealing with enterprise employees.
Opponents of a broad attorney-client privilege in the case of corporations
have expressed two primary concerns in arguing for a narrow privilege.
First, they argue that a broad privilege would allow an enterprise to
"funnel" information through its attorneys and thereby prevent discovery
of facts which should be discoverable. Secondly, they argue that the result
would be a "zone of silence."' 42 The application of a functional test to
discovery from a corporate party would not allow "funneling" or create a
zone of silence. As the Supreme Court noted in Upjohn, the facts which a
person knows are discoverable; it is only certain communications with43
counsel that are subject to the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
A functional approach recognizes that most enterprise employees who
possess relevant information speak for or represent the organization in some
sense and therefore should be treated as parties in order to assure the
enterprise's effective representation by counsel. The requirements of effective
representation by counsel include, but are not limited to protecting the
enterprise's attorney-client privilege, whatever its scope or application may
be in a particular case. Stated differently, a functional approach to discovery
from a corporate party in no way modifies or otherwise affects the scope
or application of the attorney-client privilege.
A functional approach takes into account both the broadened application of the privilege as defined by Upjohn and the practical requirements
of effective representation of an enterprise, which by its very nature can
act and speak only through agents for whose actions and statements during
the course of the relationship the enterprise will generally be liable. A
functional definition of the term "party" treats those employees who are
deemed to be "parties" for liability purposes as parties for discovery
purposes. A functional approach to the definition of a party for discovery
purposes should protect the legitimate interests of the enterprise while
simultaneously providing adverse counsel with much clearer guidelines for
the conduct of discovery. To the extent uncertainty still exists-and it is

142. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449
U.S. 383 (1981); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied To Corporations,65 YALE
L. J. 953, 955 (1956). The United States Supreme Court in Upjohn rejected these arguments.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.
143. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395. See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, WEmNSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, 503(1)[04] (1975).
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inevitable that some uncertainty will always exist-recognition of the need

for and the ethical propriety of seeking a judicial resolution should enable
adverse counsel to at least avoid the serious and intractable ethical dilemmas
which have confounded counsel under the old rule.'4
A functional rule of discovery should not diminish the quantum of
relevant, non-privileged information available to the opposition. It would
facilitate the exchange of information with enterprise counsel that might

not otherwise occur and would help assure that the legitimate rights and
interests of all parties are protected through the effective representation of

counsel. In the highly regulated and complex legal environment in which
we live and work, the right to effective representation by counsel is the sine
qua non of the protection and assertion of each party's rights under the
law. The denial of full and effective representation by counsel will inevitably

undermine a party's ability to protect its legitimate interests in our lawyerdominated adversary system of justice.
As applied in most jurisdictions, there are two principal objections to
the current majority rule governing discovery from employees of an enterprise. First, the rule is generally too narrow in scope and therefore does

not include non-managerial employees whose conduct or statements may
have given rise to the matter in dispute or whose statements may be binding
on the enterprise as the admissions of a party. The failure to treat these
employees as party representatives may effectively deny the enterprise the
benefit of full and effective representation by counsel. Secondly, the rule's

uneven and uncertain application, as well as the conflicting ethical obligations created by a failure to clearly distinguish between parties and witnesses,

will often place adverse counsel in a dilemma and expose them and their
clients to the possibility of sanctions. That possibility is manifestly unfair
in a situation in which ambiguity and uncertainty are inherent.
The traditional rule governing ex parte interviews with current and past
enterprise employees appears to be based at least in part on a now outmoded

144. In MGM Hotel, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that any ambiguity with
respect to an employee's status may be resolved unilaterally by counsel for the adverse party.
The scope of Morris' authority, just as his status, was not for Cozen to decide.
Such a determination should be made by the court, not by Cozen based only on subjective
reflection.
Slip opinion, supra note 106, at 22, n.12. The Ninth Circuit cited L.A. County Bar Opinion
410 as support for its reasoning. While presenting otherwise unresolvable issues to the court carries
with it the risk that counsel for the enterprise who has not already done so will make
a Rule 3.4(0 request to the enterprise employees who are the subject of dispute, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in effect adopt the view that there is no "right" to interview
enterprise employees because of their substantial identity with the enterprise; therefore, presentation of the matter to court will not cause an adverse party to be deprived of an opportunity
to which they are normally "entitled." Moreover, counsel who brings such an issue to the
court will have fully satisfied his or her ethical obligations to all parties. As Hazard and
Hodes note, "the only thing [adverse counsel] ... gives up is the right to catch [the employee]
...unaware, before the company's lawyer legitimately requests [the employee's] ... silence,
pursuant to Rule 3.4(f)." See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 141, at 437.
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view of the scope of the attorney-client privilege as applied to corporations
and other enterprises. To the extent the rule was co-extensive with the now
discredited control group test, it is subject to the same deficiencies and
should be rejected. Moreover, the traditional rule ignores significant aspects
of the agency basis of enterprise liability and the requirements of effective
enterprise representation by counsel; the rule is deficient for those additional
reasons.
In addition to the factors which were relevant under the alter ego rule,
other factors must be analyzed in evaluating the propriety of ex parte
contacts with employees or former employees of an enterprise.
1. The implied prohibition against efforts by an attorney to invade
another party's attorney-client privilege.145 This prohibition must be analyzed
in light of the privilege's underlying purposes as articulated by Upjohn and
the scope given to the privilege by the Supreme Court in that case. Such
an analysis and the requirements of effective representation by counsel
suggest that no current or former employee who may have privileged
communications with counsel regarding the matter in controversy should be
subject to ex parte contacts by adverse counsel.
2. The prohibition against communicating with an adverse party known
to be represented by counsel without the consent of counsel.'4 Under the
emerging rule, this prohibition requires a functional analysis, based on the
rules of agency and evidence, in order to identify those employees who may
be deemed to be party representatives for purposes of establishing enterprise
liability or asserting the rights of the enterprise. No ex parte contacts should
be permitted with these employees.
An adversary should obtain no evidentiary or discovery advantage
because of the fact that one party to a dispute is an enterprise, which of
necessity must act through various individuals. Therefore, the ethics committees of the ABA and the various states, as well as the courts, should
adopt a rule which deems any present or former employee who is identified
with an enterprise, either for purposes of resolving disputed issues or
effective representation of the enterprise, to be a party representative for
discovery purposes. Any other rule would put enterprises at a distinct and
unfair advantage and may effectively deny enterprises the full benefit of
representation by counsel, a fundamental right which is one of the mainstays
of our adversarial system of justice.

145. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101(A) and (B); Model Rules,
ER 1.6(a); see also ABA Informal Opinion 83-1498.
146. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(1) and ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, ER 4.2.

